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Law in Hiding:
Market Principles in the
Global Legal Order
Odette Lienau*
Standing in the background of the global legal order are a range of what might be called
“market principles” or “market givens”collective presentations or beliefs about how
markets workwhich are treated as objective descriptions at a particular time and place.
This Article argues that such market givens should be understood as a kind of “law in
hiding,” shaping the policy space available to states and other actors and affecting global
legal developments in important but unrecognized ways. Drawing on examples from
global financial law, rules on capital mobility, and sovereign debt practices, I demonstrate
how market principles can provide the real substantive content for conventionally
recognized law, effectively counter official law, and act as powerful rules in the absence of
clear legal standards. I further consider why “law” is a suitable categorization for these
market principles, adopting a broad definition that derives from and pushes forward
recent international legal scholarship. I contend that deliberately incorporating market
principles into our understanding of the global legal order would be not only theoretically
plausible but also productive, especially by expanding the field of legal work and activism
and by raising important questions about lawmaking mechanisms, accountability, and
norm coherence. I also suggest that market principles have thus far escaped attention
from lawyers in part because of tendencies and assumptions in multiple variants of
international legal scholarship itself.
In highlighting how market principles play a role in the global legal order, I do not intend
to grant them the legitimacy or presumptive obedience sometimes associated with the
label “law.” Indeed, my motivation draws in part from a concern with the capacity of
these market principles to effectively undermine policy options that may lead to better
outcomes. My goal, instead, is to place them as squarely as possible at the center of legal
analysis and critiqueand therefore to level the playing field between these market
principles and other types of principles and values we may care about.
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School, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, the Tulane Law School Workshop on Financial
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Security Policy, and U.C. San Diego Department of Politics, as well as through the American Society of
International Law Annual Research Forum and the Junior International Law Scholars Association
Conference. In addition, I would like to thank the following for their written comments and engagement:
José Alvarez, Antony Anghie, Toby Goldbach, Emilie Hafner-Burton, Christopher Kutz, Diogo Magalhaes,
Andrei Marmor, Kishani Perera, and Aziz Rana. Finally, I would like to thank Amy Holtz and the editorial
team of the Hastings Law Journal for their excellent assistance in preparing this Article for publication.
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Introduction
Standing in the background of the global legal order are a range of
what might be called “market principles” or “market givens”collective
presentations or beliefs about how markets work, which are treated as
objective descriptions at a particular time and place. Some market
principles recently dominant in the international arena include: “Sovereign
states must pay debt to maintain access to capital markets”; “Imposing
capital controls undermines investment and development”; and “Austerity
measures promote growth.” Others can be found, explicitly or implicitly,
in the pages of newspapers, economic textbooks, and policy documents.
These market principles delineate permissible and impermissible
behavior and entail associated rewards or punishments, thus forming part
of the shared background for transnational economic relations.
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This Article argues that such market givens should be understood as
a kind of “law in hiding,” shaping the policy space available to states and
other actors and affecting global legal developments in important but
unrecognized ways. This does not at all mean they are unchanging
anyone with a passing awareness of economic history (or, indeed, history
in general) will know that one era’s certain knowledge is another’s
outdated ideology. Still, at any given historical moment, a market principle
that distills and presents ostensibly objective knowledge can prove quite
powerful, as any government official can confirm. The fact that such givens
do not have a clear rulemaker or lawmaker, unlike standards or rules of
other sorts, does nothing to diminish their power or their directive capacity.
Although “mere” norms or beliefs frequently garner less attention than
other rule forms such as hard or soft law, these market principles may
actually gain in potency because they escape the additional scrutiny
associated with the labels “law,” “governance,” “standard,” or “rule.”
Indeed, my motivation draws in part from a concern with the
capacity of these market principles to effectively undermine policy
options that may lead to better outcomes. This is paired with a sense that
market principles seem to gain power from being seen as exogenous to
international law and legal criticism, including criticism from the
perspectives of human rights and governmental accountability. The goal
of this Article, then, involves placing them as squarely as possible into
the center of legal analysis and critiqueto level the playing field, in a
way, between these market principles and other types of principles and
values society may care about. This is not to suggest that they should
automatically be accorded the legitimacy and presumptive obedience
traditionally associated with law. Setting aside the thorny question of
when even conventionally recognized law deserves such habitual
acquiescence, these market principles have hardly gone through any
process that would render them particularly deserving of respect. Rather,
the goal is to highlight how such market givens nonetheless act like law,
and to suggest that, given this reality, they should be investigated and
criticized at least as intensively as law traditionally writ.
So what do I mean by “market principles”? And what impact can
they have in the international legal arena? Part I begins this Article by
more fully defining my understanding of this concept and by highlighting
how market principles in the global arena can generate the substantive
content for law, provide its interpretive core, and shape its reputational
compliance mechanisms. This Part first considers how market principles
can work through more conventionally recognized hard or soft law,
acting in ways that are often overlooked but that provide the real clout
1
for the actual functioning of these rules. It then introduces the example

1. See infra Part I.A.
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of the international law on capital controls, which demonstrates how
market principles can counter official hard law, transmitting a rule that
2
effectively undermines or obviates the ostensible law on the books.
Finally, Part I looks at the case of sovereign debt continuity to consider
how a market principle can itself act as powerful but hidden law, guiding
3
and blocking state action with significant distributional consequences.
These examples also emphasize two key elements of market principles
that become important for thinking through the potential impact of
greater legal scrutiny: First, like much of international law, they are
enforced largely through a reputational sanction, which succeeds most
when there is a high degree of ideological consensus around the market
4
principle itself. Second, these examples also underscore that, although
market principles may be stable for a time, they are not inevitable and
are therefore necessarily prone to historical variation, thus inviting a
closer look at the constellation of factors that enable change at any given
moment.
Still, even if we acknowledge the importance of market principles in
shaping global governance outcomes, is it plausible to consider them part
of the international legal order itself? Although the motivation for this
Article derives in part from the possible consequences of this
characterization, the analytical argument should also stand as a separate
matter. Part II begins to consider why, at least in the global arena, “law”
is a suitable categorization for these market principles, as opposed to
something more neutral such as “constraint.” Scholars and practitioners
have expanded the traditional boundaries of law in this field, such that it
5
already exists on something of a flexible continuum. In light of this
definitional approach, I contend that the expansion could go yet further,
particularly given that market principles display many of the features
6
that we associate with law. For example, as the capital controls and debt
continuity examples suggest, ostensibly objective market givens may in fact
be deeply contingent and largely manmadeone essential element
7
distinguishing law from other regularities or constraints. Market principles
themselves, even if they are assumed to be an objective element external

2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. For a discussion of the importance of reputational sanctions in international law, see Andrew T.
Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory 33–48 (2008) (noting that
reputational sanction is one key mechanism for the enforcement of international law, along with
reciprocal noncompliance and retaliation); Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 Harv.
Int’l L.J. 231, 236–37 (2009). On the centrality of ideological consensus for reputation, see Beth A.
Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International
Political Economy, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 171, 173 (2004).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.B (discussing some of the features associated with law).
7. See id. (including discussion of law as manmade).
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to (and unmovable by) law at any particular time, should presumptively be
understood as among the global rules that are shaped by actor decisions,
governance structures, and broader legal ideologies in a mutually
constitutive dynamic. Although these economic givens are sometimes
loosely called “laws of the market,” part of my argument is that such
references need to be thought through more seriously.
Next, Part III considers the potential effect of more deliberately
incorporating market principles into our understanding of the legal
order, and suggests that calling them “law” is not only plausible but also
productive. Taking these norms out of hiding and recognizing their
importance in legal functioning would encourage several types of
productive analysis. First, it would encourage lawyers to take more
comprehensive stock of the rules that actually impact particular issues,
8
and could therefore shift certain forms of legal work and activism.
Second, this kind of lawyerly attention could make a contribution to the
empirical understanding of market principles, even beyond that likely to
9
be generated in the social sciences. Third, we could productively apply
certain normative questions and frameworks associated with law to
10
market principles. For example, legal scholars have noted that efforts to
determine what the rules areto identify, codify, and institutionalize
11
rulestend to trigger a mechanism for assessment and change. This in
turn raises a range of thorny questions: If a given market principle is already
generating rules in the global legal order, who are its rulemakers? What
does it even mean to ask about rulemakers in this context, and how do we
raise corresponding questions about accountability? In addition, lawyers
are more likely than other individuals to ask whether the rules generated
by market principles cohere with other standards in the global legal
system. If the rule embedded in a particular market principle conflicts
with emerging international rules, such as peremptory norms of human
rights, is this a problem? If so, how should it be resolved? Part III also
suggests that such questioning might help to enable beneficial policy
options that are otherwise blocked by market principles, in particular by
undermining the ideological consensus that underpins the reputational
12
enforcement of any market given. Finally, this Article acknowledges the

8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Part III.C.
11. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Social Conventions: From Language to Law 50–51 (2009). Marmor
distinguishes between encyclopedic and legislative codification and suggests that this triggering is
associated with legislative codification, which seeks to determine authoritatively what the rules are.
However, the disagreement about (or expansion of) the sources and boundaries for international law,
discussed in Part II.A, make these types of distinctions less applicable.
12. See infra Part III.D.
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risk of inadvertently legitimating market principles by calling them
13
“law,” but suggests that this risk is unlikely to materialize in practice.
In light of their seeming importance and the recently expanded
understandings of “law” in the global arena, Part IV asks why market
principles have escaped serious scrutiny by international lawyers thus far. It
suggests that one essential reason they have remained in hiding, so to speak,
lies in the tendencies of international legal scholarship itself. Although the
dynamic of market principles in the global legal order parallels the
interaction of law and norms in other areas, I argue that this dynamic tends
to contradict a key assumption in much of international law. In particular,
multiple variants of international legal scholarship explicitly or implicitly
assume that global rules are deliberately chosen as rules in some way, by
either states or other agents. Some of this writing even posits the existence
of a hierarchy in the importance or effectiveness of legal formsa
continuum (in ascending order of importance) of norms, customs, soft law,
and then hard law. This scholarship seems to suppose that advocates of
any particular rule will want to move up this hierarchy in order to solidify
the effectiveness of their preferred standard. Rational choice and even
constructivist scholars, both of whom focus in different ways on how
actors construct law, are apt to reinforce this privileging of chosen law,
even if they embrace international legal pluralism and acknowledge the
14
mutual constitution of norms, laws, and actors. Critical international
legal scholars have considered how knowledge practices can shape the
substance and contours of law, but tend to exhort scholars to look
beyond law rather than to recognize the ways in which market principles
already work or act as law and thus might be subject to more standard
15
tools of legal analysis.
Although the arguments of this Article are grounded in international
legal theory and in examples with transnational ramifications, nothing
connects these claims exclusively to the global level. Scholars in
international law and international relations have thought very explicitly
about the multiple possible forms and effects of global rules in recent
years, pressed on by bigger questions about what counts as “law” and
whether it really can exist in the absence of sovereign power and action.
This rich literature thus informs the questions and contentions of this
Article. But beliefs about how markets workindeed, beliefs about the
purportedly inevitable causal mechanisms of the social world more
generallycan shape expectations and practice across all levels of legal
interaction; this phenomenon is hardly unique to transnational economic
law. Norms and collective beliefs about ostensibly objective facts are present
13. See infra Part III.E.
14. See infra Part IV.A (discussing rational choice approaches); see infra Part IV.B (discussing
constructivist approaches).
15. See infra Part IV.C.
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in every facet of social life, including not only economic functioning but also
informal strictures related to gender, race, and other areas. Indeed, this key
insight underpins many studies of the extent to which legal practice is
embedded in broader social structures. But the ways in which this
particular subcategory of market norms functions within international
economic law is understudied, and this lack of attention seems puzzling
and problematic given its actual importance. In a way, the goal here is to
argue, with a degree of nuance and specificity appropriate to the subject
matter, in favor of an insight relatively easily accepted in other arenas of
legal actionnamely, that the law on the books and the law in practice may
be fundamentally distinct. Acknowledging the law in practice, including how
market principles are part of this practice, is essential to a full understanding
of the global legal order.
I. Market Principles in the Law
So how do I define market principles and where do they fit into the
global legal order? Although scholarship on contemporary international law
has become capacious in its scope, certain elements have still tended to be
understood as exogenous to the legal arena. Among these elements are what
I call market principles or market givenscollective beliefs about how
markets work as an objective matter. These are not self-consciously
politically or morally directed beliefs about appropriate market action (such
as “it is wrong to sell humans into slavery” or “markets should be designed
16
to alleviate poverty”). Rather, market principles as defined here are
those underlying understandings about market functioning that people
often take to be grounded not in political or moral principle but rather in
ostensibly objectively determined facts about the world. An example
might be the contention that inflation results from soft central bankers,
or that the imposition of capital controls will lead to slower growth
17
relative to an accepted baseline. Of course, these principles may still be
politically and morally inflected, and they may have important political
and moral ramifications. However, that is not how they are presented
18
and initially understood. Indeed, the very effectiveness of these beliefs
can draw in part from the fact that they are not taken to be based on
19
politics, morality, or law. Instead, these causal ideas arelike principles

16. Such explicit morally or politically derived norms certainly play a crucial role in shaping
international law and have also played an important role in international legal theory, as discussed later in
the Article. See, e.g., infra Part IV.B.
17. These examples are provided by Jonathan Kirshner, though in a different theoretical framework.
See Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics 4–12 (Jonathan Kirshner ed., 2003).
18. Kirshner’s edited volume focusing on monetary politics provides several examples or case studies of
how economic statements are not presented as (or taken to be) political and changeable. See generally id.
19. Kirshner notes that “[f]undamentally political struggles about money are routinely cloaked in
economic terms, often throwing students of politics off the scent.” Id. at 3–4.
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of the natural sciencesimplicitly understood to be external to and
unchangeable by legal mechanisms. They are “givens” or “truths,” more
like the majestic law of gravity than the prosaic law of traffic lights. Of
course, what counts as a “given” inevitably shifts over timesupposedly
objective knowledge changes regularly in both the natural and social
sciences. But a closer interrogation of these “matters of fact” is left to
other disciplines and, although these facts may become part of the
external background for international economic law, they are not
20
scrutinized as part of the legal order itself.
This Part lays the groundwork for the argument that market
principles are in fact very much part of the global legal order, broadly
understood, and contends that they should be studied as such. Market
givens can generate the substantive content for hard or soft law, shape the
interpretation of such law, and also construct (or stiffen) its compliance
mechanisms. As the example of capital controls demonstrates, they can
actually displace the formal law officially on the books, effectively
21
transmitting a contrary rule. Even in the absence of any obvious directive,
as in the case of sovereign debt continuity, market principles may
constitute law-like rules themselves, constraining state behavior and
22
undermining efforts to develop alternative doctrines.
Each of these examples highlights a key feature that market
principles share with many other forms of international lawnamely, that
23
they are enforced largely through a reputational sanction. This points to
the importance of relative consensus in maintaining the strength of a
market principle, and also to the potential for weakening or undermining a
market principle by breaking down that ideological accord. As Beth
Simmons and Zachary Elkins have noted, ideological consensus “alters
24
the reputational payoffs associated with policy choice.” The capital
controls and sovereign debt continuity examples in particular also
highlight another important feature of market principles, namely, their
25
Although rules and
contingency and potential changeability.
regularities of all sorts inevitably constrain and condition actor
behaviorwhile not being law-like themselvesthis manmade element
of market principles helps bring them into the conceptual orbit of law as
opposed to that of other regularities identifiable in the world.

20. Part III.B discusses how the development and falsification of market principles interacts with
theories and models in the social science disciplines, and also suggests that introducing a more lawyerly
mindset might be productive in this empirical arena as well.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4, at 33; Brewster, supra note 4, at 236.
24. Simmons & Elkins, supra note 4, at 173. The role of ideological consensus is discussed in further
detail later in this Part.
25. See infra Part I.B; infra Part I.C (highlighting the element of changeability).

Lienau-68.3.doc (Do Not Delete)

April 2017]

5/25/2017 8:39 PM

MARKET PRINCIPLES IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER

549

A. At Work in Conventional Law
Scholars of law and politics have highlighted that states and other
actors can choose from multiple mechanisms in constructing the rules of
global governancefrom formal hard law such as binding treaties to soft
law mechanisms including guidelines and codes of conduct, which may
generate less controversy due to their relative flexibility, imprecision, or
26
nonbinding nature. Among the many issues implicated by this literature
are the questions of how actors select and interpret the content for these
27
rules and also how these rules are actually enforced. One way in which
market principles are part of the global legal order is by working through
this type of more conventionally recognized global lawby generating
the substantive content for international rules, shaping the interpretation
of such rules, and providing the bite for their compliance mechanisms.
As such, they can play a dispositive role in determining legal outcomes
without, paradoxically, being identified as a key component of the legal
order itself.
One central goal of the institutions and laws of global governance is
to coordinate state action around a set of rules that ideally constitutes an
28
improvement for all. But where does the substance of these standards
come from? From an institutional design perspective, a key way that
market principles may shape law is by providing focal points for this type
29
of rulemaking. Certainly, one actor or another, calculating to promote
their own interest and their own vision of the public good, may propose
correspondingly self-serving rules or standards. But these actors’
proposals can also instantiate a set of beliefs about how markets work as
an objective matter, and seek to ensure that markets function efficiently
and smoothly, in a way that would serve not only the proposals’ sponsors
but also others in the broader global system.

26. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 Int’l Org. 421, 421 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. Legal
Analysis 171, 172 (2010); Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 Int’l
Org. 495, 500 (1991); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 2–3 (2002).
27. See generally sources cited supra note 26; Guzman, supra note 4. The literature on rational
institutions also provides insight into these issues. For a foundational volume, see generally Barbara
Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 Int’l Org. 761 (2001).
28. Although there is no universally agreed upon definition of global governance, the report by
the independent Commission on Global Governance in 1995 defined it as “the sum of the many ways
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process
through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be
taken.” Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and
Processes of Global Governance 3–4 (2d ed. 2010).
29. This resonates with the broader literature on how ideas can serve as focal points for coordination,
policy, and rulemaking. For an early example, see Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests,
and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market, in Ideas and Foreign Policy:
Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change 173–206 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
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This foundational role of market beliefs can exist at a very deep
background level, as with the complex set of global trade rules and
institutions built on the market principles of free trade and comparative
advantage. Such beliefs about market functioning not only have grounded
and justified the initial founding of institutions and conventions such as the
World Trade Organization and Bilateral Investment Treaties, but also
30
continue to shape how these regimes’ rules are used and interpreted. This
impact can also exist at the level of actors selecting more fine-grained and
modest guidelines and codes of conduct. For example, speaking of soft
financial institutions, Chris Brummer points out that certain global
governance rules may:
[A]rticulate norms that have not previously been systematized. What are,
in fact, preferred practices have not been explicitly identified as such but
are simply matters of habit or widely followed practice that are implicit
and taken for granted. Once regulators identify and express best
31
practices . . . those practices become explicit and prescriptive.

Thus market principles can play an essential role in quietly shaping best
practices and expectations, which may eventually be codified (and
possibly strengthened) through more conventional legal forms.
For example, the Group of 20 (“G-20”) finance ministers and central
bank governors regularly issue pronouncements that implicate or adopt
particular beliefs about economic functioning; these declarations
sometimes explicitly seek to identify the (ideally) objective determinants
of particular economic outcomes around which further policy might be
formulated. The G-20’s September 2013 Leaders’ Declaration, for
example, noted the endorsement of a work plan to help “assess factors
affecting the availability and accessibility of long-term financing for
investment and committed to identify and start to implement a set of
collective and country-specific measures that tangibly improve our
32
domestic investment environments [sic].” While the ultimate policy

30. For example, the foundational texts of the global trade regime make exceptions for developing
countries, as a carve out from their general commitment to free trade and comparative advantage. However,
particularly in the earlier decades of the trade regime, these exceptions tended to be read narrowly. See,
e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade 324 (1995). It is
possible that World Trade Organization (“WTO”) adjudicative bodies are now attempting to make room for
greater exceptions on the basis of moral issues, as suggested by the recent EC-Seals decision of the WTO
Appellate Body (though this moral exception approach was criticized by some developing countries). For
more on the import of EC-Seals, see, for example, Gregory Shaffer & David Pabian, European
CommunitiesMeasures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, 109 Am. J. Int’l L. 154,
154–61 (2015). For a critical take on the main institutions of global governance and the argument that these
institutions and their associated rules (and presumably associated market principles) constitute a nascent
imperial global state serving the interests of a transnational capitalist class, see B. S. Chimni, International
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 1 (2004).
31. Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st
Century 151 (2d ed. 2015).
32. Russia G-20, G-20 Leaders’ Declaration 3–4 (2013).
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recommendations, which become the focal point for international
coordination, are more readily identified as global law, much of the work
of that “law” is actually done by the beliefs about how investment markets
work, as determined and formulated by the study group called for in the
declaration. The post-2008 crisis Financial Stability Board exhibits a
similar dynamic, also issuing reports about the determinants of market
success or failure along with related recommendations and standards
33
designed to strengthen global finance. Thus, market beliefs about the
efficacy or harm of particular actions can remain prior to, and in fact may
affect the selection and success of, the subsequent officialized rule.
In addition to this background content-generating function, market
principles can also play an important role in reputational enforcement
within the global legal order. Concern about reputation, defined as the
beliefs about an actor’s likely future actions based on that actor’s past
actionsis frequently presented as one reason states choose to comply
with international agreements even when it might be in their interest to
34
violate their provisions. While it is possible for reputational effects to be
entirely internal (that is, relevant only among the parties to the actual
agreement in question), a state’s actions may also affect its reputation in
the eyes of a broader range of actors, possibly up to the international
35
community writ large. Indeed, one of the key enforcement mechanisms
for a range of legal agreements, particularly but not only those in global
finance, is understood to involve the expected reaction of capital markets
and broader audiences to a given state action, based on market actors’
likely beliefs about the appropriateness of that action under the
36
circumstances. The capital controls and sovereign debt continuity
examples below highlight the centrality of this reputational mechanism
for market principles.
Of course, the more specific interrelations of reputational effect,
background market givens, and identifiable financial regulations can be

33. The Financial Stability Board continued the actions of its predecessor, the Financial Stability
Forum, on this front. Its reports, including published standards and country peer reviews, are made
available on its website. See Publications, Fin. Stability Board, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).
34. For important studies of reputation in political science, see Beth A. Simmons, International
Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 819 (2000); Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt
Across Three Centuries (2007); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation & International Politics (1996).
35. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4, at 33–48; Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An
Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 506–07 (2005); Brewster, supra note 4; see
also Odette Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Politics, Reputation, and Legitimacy in Modern
Finance 26–28 (2014).
36. Brummer, focusing primarily on the reputation of regulators among their peers, similarly notes
that “international financial regulation, though formally a species of ‘soft law,’ is bolstered by various
disciplining mechanisms that render it, under certain circumstances, more coercive than traditional
theories of international law predict.” Brummer, supra note 31, at 120.
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hard to tease out. Brummer suggests that “international financial law can
help shape the perceptions of investors, lenders, and other relevant
37
market participants as to the value of any particular kind of conduct,”
which might in turn impact reputational consequences. But to what
degree are these new regulations always shaping market participants’
own understandings of economic cause and effect? Or, in other words,
do these rules really result in investors buying into a previously
unaccepted set of ideasfor example, that heightened bank capital
requirements will stabilize a domestic financial system and thus justify a
lower cost of capital for firms in that jurisdiction?
The alternative is also possible and at least equally likelynamely,
that crucial work is being done by a prior set of market beliefs. Jonathan
Kirshner has pointed out that a unique feature of monetary politicsand
perhaps by extension a range of financial issuesis its distinctive
relationship to ideas, given that money has no inherent content or value.
Thus, its distinguishing attributes include “the unique link between ideas
and ‘market sentiment’ . . . and the overwhelming influence of that
38
sentiment on the ability to practice macroeconomic policy.” Kirshner
suggests that the policy most likely to be successful or credible is that
“which ‘the market’ thinks is right. Policies that are not credible cannot
39
be sustained because of the responses of market actors to such policies.”
Although here Kirshner refers most directly to domestic policy choices
and policy autonomy, there is good reason to expect that this market
sentiment dynamic would extend to the viability of transgovernmental
rulemaking as well.
In short, certain beliefs and principlesgrounded in assessments about
market functioning and resulting in expectations about appropriate
actionare likely to affect not only the initial selection behavior of
rulemakers but also the subsequent compliance decisions of actors subject to
the resulting rules. To the extent that credibility or reputation play a role in
enforcing particular legal rules and the policy choices that they enact,
market principlesincluding beliefs about how particular economic actions
will impact market position or market functioningmay themselves delimit
the workable parameters of law more conventionally understood. Relatedly,
if a preferred law violates underlying market principlesand if it is unable
to help shift key beliefs over timeit is unlikely to be successful and so may
fall by the wayside, even if it is instantiated in an officially adopted legal rule.
So there is good reason to consider the possibility that the crucial
enforcement mechanism of reputation in some international law derives
force not so much from carefully formalized rules (though certainly those
37. Id. at 150.
38. Jonathan Kirshner, The Inescapable Politics of Money, in Monetary Orders: Ambiguous
Economics, Ubiquitous Politics, supra note 17, at 13.
39. Id.
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are still helpful and clarifying) but instead from unchosen and even
unacknowledged background beliefs about ostensibly objective market
facts.
As a result, these market principles can have surprisingly certain effects
within particular issue areas. They can be incorporated into other more
conventionally understood legal work, producing the substantive content for
law and shaping the important compliance mechanism of reputation. And
the violation of these principles can have real consequences for the actors
involved, despite the lack of legal attention paid to them. Indeed, it may well
be the case that the work or effect attributed to more recognizable legal
rules is actually being done by these hidden market principles.
B. The Counter-Law of Capital Mobility
While market principles may act by generating the content and
supporting the compliance mechanisms for conventionally recognized
law, such embedding and formalization is not necessary for their legal or
law-like work. As the example of capital controls demonstrates, market
principles can actually displace the formal law officially on the books,
effectively transmitting a contrary rule. Indeed, for capital controls,
studying the hard law in order to understand the rules on the ground
would result in hapless confusion. Although the official law grants states
significant policy space to impose capital controls as they see fit, this
formal rule has at times been entirely contravened by a market
principleaccepted and promoted by key International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”) staffthat effectively mandated open capital accounts.
Cross-border capital flowswhich are the streams of money into and
out of a country that link it to the global economyhave been a significant
topic of discussion and a target of potential regulation in international
40
economic relations. From a recipient country’s perspective, such crossborder capital can provide much needed funding for the local economy
at more reasonable interest rates than are available domestically,
whether for public investment, private business growth, or increased
41
household consumption. And, from a sending country’s perspective,
allowing domestic capital to flow overseas may result in higher rates of
42
return on investment. That said, there is certainly no guarantee that
cross-border funds will move where they are most productively
employed as opposed to moving toward the faddish investment of the
43
moment. A surplus of funds can also facilitate asset bubbles, where the
price of certain assets may become unreasonably and unstably high (real
40. Adam Feibelman calls them “the connective tissue of the international financial system.” Adam
Feibelman, The IMF and Regulation of Cross-Border Capital Flows, 15 Chi. J. Int’l L. 409, 411 (2015).
41. See, e.g., id. at 411–12.
42. See, e.g., id.
43. See, e.g., id.
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estate and tech startups are recent examples). It may also fuel inflation,
pushing the supply of money beyond what is needed for the goods
available for purchase. It can even impact the exchange rate: When
significant foreign funds move in and need to be converted into local
currency, the value of local currency can increase relative to foreign
currencies, thus making the country’s export commodities more costly on
international markets and potentially dampening a country’s export
44
sectors. And all of this works in reverse as wellthe rapid outflow of
capital can factor in drying up much needed funds, compromising a
domestic banking sector, tanking a local currency, and making essential
45
imports too costly.
Unsurprisingly, given both the potential and the problems inherent in
global capital flows, sovereign governments have frequently sought to
46
regulate the movement of capital into and out of their domestic economies.
The measures for achieving this goalcapital controlsmay apply generally
or may target specific sectors and can include taxes and tariffs on inflows or
47
outflows, volume restrictions, and other mechanisms. There has been some
empirical disagreement about the basic desirability of unregulated capital
inflows and outflows, and also about the actual efficacy of any regulations
48
that might be put in place to dampen them. Nonetheless, a number of
sovereign states have continued to see the value in such controls, or at
49
least in retaining the policy space to access these measures when needed.
How have sovereign attempts to manage such flows been treated by
the relevant global rules? Certain subgroups of statesin particular the
developed state members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (“OECD”) and the European Unionhave agreed to
mandate capital account liberalization, for example through the OECD
50
Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements. However, the most

44. These and other problems are especially associated with “hot money,” and there is some concern
that the group mentality frequently at work in finance can exacerbate these dynamics. For a brief policyoriented overview of the pros and cons of liberalizing capital accounts, see M. Ayhan Kose & Eswar
Prasad, Capital Accounts: Liberalize or Not?, Int’l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/fandd/basics/capital.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).
45. See id.
46. See Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices, and
Consequences (Sebastian Edwards ed., 2007); see also Andrés Fernández et al., Capital Control Measures: A
New Dataset (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/80, 2015) (presenting a new dataset of capital
controls from 1995 to 2013).
47. See Olivier Jeanne et al., Who Needs to Open the Capital Account? 4–5 (2012); Hal S. Scott &
Anna Gelpern, International Finance: Transactions, Policy, and Regulation 1274–79 (19th ed. 2012).
48. See Kevin Gallagher, Regaining Control? Capital Controls and the Global Financial Crisis 8–9
(Political Econ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 250, 2011); see also Scott & Gelpern, supra note 47,
at 1274–79; Feibelman, supra note 40, at 422 n.67.
49. See all sources cited supra note 48.
50. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements
(2016). See Stephany Griffith-Jones et al., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
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broadly applicable formal international law relevant to capital controlsthe
IMF Articles of Agreement, pertinent to the institution’s 188 member
51
states clearly supports the right of governments to employ such measures.
Article VI very explicitly notes that states are permitted to “exercise such
52
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements.” A
carve out does exist for current transactionspayments for traded goods
and services, interest, remittances, and the likeproviding that “no member
shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of
53
payments and transfers for the current international transactions.” But this
current account liberalization provision still leaves a significant amount of
leeway for a government actor to impose controls in an effort to manage the
sizable inflows and outflows of other forms of capital.
This openness in the written law makes sense given that the designers
of the modern international financial system were hardly sanguine about
unrestricted cross-border capital flows. As Annamaria Viterbo points out,
these key architects in the waning years of World War II “did not consider
54
capital account convertibility either necessary or desirable.” In 1956, the
IMF executive board reiterated that: “Members are free to adopt a policy
of regulating capital movements for any reason . . . without approval of the
55
Fund.” A 1978 amendment to Article IV of the Fund’s Articles, which
had legalized floating exchange rates following the end of the Bretton
Woods era gold-dollar system, did allow the Fund to “exercise firm
56
surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members.” But this
amendment did not reach the issue of capital liberalization, and the
process failed to provide even a less ambitious code of conduct, despite
57
preliminary efforts in this direction.

Management of Capital Flows: Comparative Experience and Implications for Africa Part 2, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/2003/1 (Apr. 2003) (providing an overview of the experience for OECD countries).
51. IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, Int’l Monetary Fund
(last updated Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx.
52. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. VI, § 3.
53. Id. Art. VIII, § 2(a). The Articles define current account transactions as “payments which are not
for the purpose of transferring capital,” including payments associated with trade, services, short-term
banking and credit extensions, loan interest payments, investment income, moderate payments for loan
amortization or investment depreciations, and moderate family remittances. Id. Art. XXX(d). Of course,
this definition itself is complex and leaves some gray areas, and so the IMF Balance of Payments Manual,
updated periodically, makes an effort to update definitions and standardize usage of these terms.
54. Annamaria Viterbo, International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to
States’ Sovereignty and Dispute Settlement 179 (Alan O. Sykes et al. eds., 2012).
55. Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance 132 (2007); see also
Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization (2010).
56. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. IV. The precise meaning of “firm surveillance” would of
course eventually have to be worked out through staff policies. For an overview of the legal framework of
Article IV, see Int’l Monetary Fund Legal Dep’t, Article IV of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement:
An Overview of the Legal Framework 3 (June 2006).
57. See Abdelal, supra note 55, at 133–35.
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Still, the uniformity, state policy leeway, and stability suggested by the
formal international law has not been matched on the ground, particularly
because later generations of key IMF policymakers did not share the
original concern with unfettered capital liberalization reflected in the
written rule. As such, the actual unwritten rule has shifted significantly
since 1945, at moments resulting in a real constraint on a state’s ability to
58
impose capital controls. In particular, the collective beliefs about the
market impact and advisability of capital controls changed, especially in
59
the late 1980s and through the mid-1990s. During this period, and
despite the absence of a clear legal basis, the IMF began to encourage
60
liberalization by its member states. As a former IMF executive director
noted, “[c]apital account liberalization had become an accepted part of
our orthodoxy. It had for some time been Fund policy to promote capital
61
account liberalization.”
The Fund did not aggressively press for the elimination of capital
controls in every instance, and differences emerged between various
groups within the Fund, including between departments in charge of
62
differing regions or areas. However, an official IMF report from 1997
did formally acknowledge that, although the Articles only mentioned an
obligation to liberalize current accounts, “the Fund has in recent years
63
sought to promote capital account liberalization.” The IMF also noted
that such advocacy proceeded apace “in view of the benefits that can
accrue from capital movements and their importance in the international
64
monetary system.” In other words, the perceived market principlethe
collective beliefs about market functioninghad changed, particularly
within the IMF staff. Some within the IMF even lobbied for an
amendment to the Articles of Agreement to further enshrine the new
market principle on the topic and place capital account liberalization
formally in the IMF bailiwick. This effort was eventually led publicly by
IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus, whose 1997 speech
exhorting the board to adopt the amendment argued that countries

58. See Feibelman, supra note 40.
59. See Abdelal, supra note 55; see also Chwieroth, supra note 55.
60. The IMF was subsequently criticized severely for this advice, along with other policy
recommendations that came to be known. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Crisis
That Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF 10 (2003) (noting that the IMF’s
credibility was damaged by the financial crises of the late 1990s, and also that the IMF itself spearheaded the
movement to liberalize global capital).
61. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 128–29.
62. See generally Chwieroth, supra note 55 (providing a detailed look at the differences of opinion
across factions of the IMF staff, in particular the differences between those who advocated a more
gradualist and carefully sequenced approach to capital liberalization and those who pressed for a “big
bang” approach that argued in favor of full liberalization as a “first-best” policy).
63. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 137.
64. Id.
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cannot “compete for the blessings of global capital markets and refuse
65
their disciplines.”
What accounts for this shift? Although much has been said about
the Wall Street-Treasury-IFI complex, implying that perhaps IMF
actions are coordinated to promote the interests of the U.S. government
66
or private financial actors, the evidence suggests otherwise. Indeed,
scholars highlight that the U.S. Treasury was lukewarm at best in regard to
the amendmentcertainly not in the driver’s seatand that the Treasury
and the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF fell entirely silent on the issue
67
of the amendment upon signs of disapproval from Congress. And while
private financial actors generally supported capital liberalization, they
tended to remain suspicious of any policy shift that could concentrate
additional power outside of Wall Street, and were especially distressed
68
that they had not been consulted as part of the process.
Although the effort to amend the Articles ultimately failed, it would
hardly be accurate to say that this was due to any particular strength of
the hard law rule allowing capital controls. The Fund had by then
effectively adopted an informal soft law rule in favor of liberalization,
though its staff did not necessarily recommend liberalization
69
indiscriminately. Interestingly, the former IMF Director of Research,
subsequently serving as the Dutch Executive Director, opposed the
amendment by highlighting that the Fund had already “wholeheartedly
embraced capital liberalization . . . without being hindered by a lack of
70
mandate.” His opposition rested primarily with the concern that, if
given a legal mandate, Fund staff would feel pressured to insist strictly on
liberalization, “making sure at each step that any policy it recommends
71
or endorses can pass the test of the new Article.” Others agreed that the
lack of a legal mandate did not act as a deterrent or a hindrance to the
new rule. Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers admitted that
“[b]y the 1990s . . . no one thought that the Fund was at all faithful to its
72
charter. . . . The goals they had outlined . . . were anachronistic.” Indeed,
Jeffrey Chwieroth highlights that “the initiative to amend the Articles in

65. Id. at 155 (emphasizing the centrality of European IMF officials in these efforts). But cf.
Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 156 (emphasizing that internal shift in beliefs happened firstthat “the
staff had changed their normative outlook in the 1980s prior to any active management involvement
on the issue.”).
66. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars,
77 Foreign Aff. 7, 7 (1998) (explaining the general idea of a Wall Street-Treasury-IFI complex as a theme in
some commentary is traceable to Jagdish Bhagwati’s coining of the Wall-Street Treasury Complex).
67. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 141, 157–58; Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 157–58.
68. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 139, 141–42, 153–54; see Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 159.
69. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 138.
70. Id. at 157.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 136.
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the late 1990s was in large part an exercise in empowering the staff with
more tools to encourage a policy that many of them had already been
73
promoting informally for nearly a decade.” Thus, the amendment was not
really necessary to the goal of clarifying a rule that disfavored capital
controls. In effect, the shift in beliefs within the IMF already constituted
something akin to an unwritten code of conduct in favor of liberalization.
This is not to say that the successful amendment of the Articles would
have made no differencerecognition of the importance of market
principles hardly entails a rejection of other rule forms as irrelevant. Nor
does it involve an insistence that market givens will gain primacy in every
instance. Successful formalization in the late 1990s could well have
emboldened those in the IMF who advocated for capital liberalization. It
also could have hardened efforts to promote more absolutist, shocktherapy style modes of liberalization even after the financial crises of
1997 and 1998 or the 2008 financial crisis, which dampened the most
74
zealous efforts to promote liberalization in emerging economies.
But it is also worth asking whether the Article amendment project
actually ended up helping to undermine the market principle itself. The
efforts to formalize what had been a fairly successful informal background
rule did draw the attention and the ire of key playersnotably the U.S.
75
Congresswho vocally rejected the effort. And the Fund’s seeming
hubris of asking for additional power to liberalize capital in the face of the
1997–1998 financial crisis, which some critics believed had been
exacerbated by speculative flows enabled by the dismantling of controls,
76
opened the IMF up to a significant degree of criticism. It also drew the
attention of scholars of economics and international politics, whose
additional scrutiny may have helped to erode the dominance of any
77
ideological consensus in favor of liberalization that previously existed. Of
course, any independent impact from the spotlight and discussion
generated by the amendment effort is difficult to tease out, especially
because the serious launch of the processrecommending the amendment
to the IMF Board of Governors at the end of 1997coincided with the
deepening of the Asian crisis as it spread from Southeast Asia to South

73. Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 9.
74. See Blustein, supra note 60, at 10; Abdelal, supra note 55, at 159 (noting that the start of the
Russian crisis in August 1998 constituted “the final nail in the coffin of the capital account amendment”).
For a brief discussion of the more measured approach to liberalization taken after the 2008 crisis, see infra
sources cited at notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
75. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 141, 157–58; Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 157–58.
76. See Blustein, supra note 60, at 10; Abdelal, supra note 55, at 159.
77. Among the most vocal scholars and critics has been Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of
the World Bank. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital-Market Liberalization, Globalization, and the
IMF, 20 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 57, 71 (2004).
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78

Korea. As such, it is likely (one hopes) that the larger global crisis would
have focused attention on the possible risks of capital liberalization in any
case.
Through all this, it is important to keep in mind that countries were of
course free to reject these background mandates, as is the case with any hard
or soft law as well. And IMF staff members insisted that capital
liberalization ultimately remained a state decision. Certainly, the powerful
lever of conditional lending, which has been employed (controversially) to
support IMF-preferred policies in other areasthough, again, always with
the voluntary acquiescence of statesremained off-limits in staff efforts to
persuade countries to liberalize their capital accounts, given that capital
liberalization was not one of the official goals stated in the Fund’s Articles.
Still, in April 1997, certain executive board members requested an opinion
from the Fund’s General Counsel, François Gianviti, on the legal status of
this less formal advocacy. According to the board minutes, he responded
that he found it:
[D]ifficult to confirm that promotion of capital account liberalization fell
within the Fund’s mandate, . . . . The Fund was not promoting
liberalization of capital investments or capital transactions as such; the
Fund had been assisting members in achieving that purpose, as their
purpose and objective, not as a purpose of the Fund itself. In fact, it would
be contrary to the right of members under Article VI to restrict capital
transactions. The Fund could perhaps persuade, convince, or explain the
benefits, but that was something else . . . . That did not mean that the Fund
had the power to impose additional obligations and, in particular, the
obligation to liberalize capital movements. What the Fund could do at the
present stage was to tell a member that there was an undesirable state of
79
affairs, and to change, but that was not an obligation.

Thus Gianviti carefully distinguished between problematic
“promotion” and permissible persuading, convincing, and explaining of
80
benefits. Of course, this dividing line is far from perfectly clear, and
different actors may well interpret any given episode of promoting versus
persuading differently. From the perspective of some countries in the
international economic system, being “told to change” by the Fund can feel
very much like an obligationperhaps even more so than other legal or
semi-legal obligations generated by more formal hard or soft law
81
instruments.

78. See Blustein, supra note 60, at 1–10 (detailing the spread of the Asian Financial Crisis into South
Korea and the IMF efforts in the South Korean crisis).
79. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 150 (quoting François Gianviti, IMF General Counsel).
80. Id.
81. See Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers 65–83
(2006). This persuasive power relies at least in part on the existence of willing interlocutors in IMF member
countries. Still, this persuasion has been quite effective. The IMF and the World Bank have succeeded in
their globalization efforts “by requiring governments to open up to global trade, investment, and capital.” Id.
at 3.
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Part of the mechanism for the influence of a market principle involves
its broader reputational enforcement, particularly once key actors,
including international economic institutions like the IMF, identify it as
82
economic orthodoxy. As mentioned in the previous Subpart, which
discussed how market principles can act in conventional law, hard or soft
law rules might actually work through the initial selection and subsequent
reputational enforcement of a background market principle. This
reputational enforcement can also help to buttress the rule generated by a
market principle more directly, without further formalization in a hard or
soft law format. While it is an oversimplification to think of capital markets
or creditors as a single, uniformly responding entity, in some historical and
institutional contexts it may in fact be the case that market actors and even
the broader audiences for state actions seem to speak with a more unified
83
voice. The existence of such an ideological consensus “alters the
84
reputational payoffs associated with policy choice.” In particular, a
state’s decision to act in a manner that counters the apparent consensus
is seen not as a reasonable selection of one among multiple plausible
policy options, but rather more like the violation of an accepted rulean
alarming signal of recalcitrance or heterodoxyand thus deserving of
greater reputational sanction in response.
This reaction may happen through investors alone, but can also be
magnified or exacerbated with the introduction of institutions such as
credit rating agencies, which have played an essential role in judging
85
sovereign financial policy and decisions since at least the mid-1970s.
Focusing on Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) in particular, Rawi Abdelal
points out that, at least through the 1980s, agencies did not seem to
associate capital controls with heterodoxy. However, “S&P’s views on
capital controls tracked the emergence of what appeared to be the new
orthodoxy in both official policy circles, such as the IMF, and among
86
financial market participants.” Thus, in the case of capital account
liberalization, particularly in its heyday of the late 1980s and through the
mid-1990s, a fairly unified reputational enforcement mechanism effectively
strengthened the market rule of capital mobility as against the technical
hard law of country choice. If a country chose to impose capital controls
during this period, it could expect to be the subject of reputational

82. For more on reputation, see sources cited supra notes 4, 35, and 36.
83. See Lienau, supra note 35, at 26–32 (discussing the risk of oversimplifying the views of creditors
and their likely reputational assessments, particularly in the sovereign debt continuity context).
84. Simmons & Elkins, supra note 4, at 173.
85. See generally Christopher M. Bruner & Rawi Abdelal, To Judge Leviathan: Sovereign Credit
Ratings, National Law, and the World Economy, 25 J. Pub. Pol’y 191 (2005) (discussing the influence of
credit rating agencies on markets in recent decades and arguing that these agencies should be required to
provide nuanced ratings); see also Lienau, supra note 35, at 208–09.
86. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 182.
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punishment, despite the existence of a hard law rule designed to ensure
flexibility and policy space.
Of course, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the market principle and
associated informal policy favoring capital liberalization, which reached a
high point in the mid-1990s, eventually fell into decline. Adam Feibelman
notes the emergence, after 2008 in particular, of “a growing consensus
among scholars and policymakers that states must carefully manage
capital flows and coordinate their policies for doing so and that direct
capital controls are a useful part of their policy toolkit in extreme
87
circumstances.” The Fund’s post-2008 crisis approach, reflected in a new
(that is, new as of 2012) institutional view of its multilateral surveillance
goals, reflects a concern about the potential that cross-border capital flows
88
can transmit financial instability. Kevin Gallagher notes that, more
generally, the change in thinking about capital controls after the 2008
financial crisis, including shifting views within the economics profession,
has allowed more policy space for emerging market economies to regulate
89
cross-border financial flows. Still, a look beyond narrow international
finance law highlights that ideas and rules about cross-border capital
liberalization have migrated outside the financial arena alone. Indeed,
the earlier rule favored by the IMF seems to have been incorporated into
other legal instruments, in particular international trade and investment
instruments that escape the multilateral coordination undertaken by the
90
IMF.
In short, in the realm of capital controls over the last several
decades, it would be highly misleading to look at the hard law in order to
understand the functioning rules. And no globally applicable soft law
standards emerged to supplement the formal rule, despite the existence
of codes of conduct relevant to smaller groups of states. But it would also
be inaccurate to suggest that this important corner of the global legal order
constituted a financial policy free-for-all. For a time, the hard law
institutional shell of the IMF simultaneously provided the space for and was
contravened by the exercise of a powerful, if ultimately somewhat unstable,

87. Feibelman, supra note 40, at 450.
88. See generally Int’l Monetary Fund, The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows:
An Institutional View (2012) (describing the increase of capital flows in recent years and how they are a
key aspect of the global monetary system).
89. Kevin P. Gallagher, Ruling Capital: Emerging Markets and the Reregulation of CrossBorder Finance 3 (2015).
90. Feibelman, supra note 40, 440–47. Gallagher too notes that:
[A]t the IMF and at the G20, EMDs have succeeded in creating more room to regulate crossborder finance but have been less successful in opening up space in the trade and investment
regimes. . . . The result is a complicated patchwork of overlapping regimes that sends mixed
signals to countries looking to regulate cross-border finance.
Gallagher, supra note 89, at 3. For more on the interaction of capital account liberalization with trade
and investment policy, see id. at 169–95.
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market principle. The collective beliefs about market functioningand
appropriate state actionheld by key policymakers and market actors
countered the policy flexibility intended by the original international
lawmakers of Bretton Woods in 1945. But the surveillance and technical
assistance functions of the IMF nonetheless meant that Fund staff, through
practices of policy promotion or aggressive persuasion, were able to press
states to align their behavior with this market principle. At least for a time,
the market principle itself thus effectively acted as a powerful rule in the
global legal order, in spite of an official law allowing much greater sovereign
policy space.
C. The Background Law of Sovereign Debt Continuity
If market principles can generate content for law and even act as
counter-law in the face of already existing hard or soft guidelines, what
impact might they have in the absence of any clear global legal directive?
The issue of sovereign debt continuity offers a look at how collective
beliefs about market functioning can operate without a clear institutional
or legal anchor. It further demonstrates how market principles may
constitute law-like rules themselves, which constrain actor behavior and
can undermine efforts to develop alternative doctrines, particularly when
these market ideas are backed by a unified reputational sanctioning
mechanism.
A core market principle in the sovereign debt arena is that
sovereign states that fail to repay debt will undermine their access to
capital markets, even if there are political or moral arguments that favor
91
cancellation, including arguments related to major regime change. This
market principle of sovereign debt continuity sets the background rule
according to which nation-state borrowers are evaluated and against
which creditors and others, including credit rating agencies, form their
reputational judgments. This rule is not promulgated or enforced
92
through any conventional legal format, such as a treaty. It is related to
the general principle of pacta sunt servandathe basic idea that
agreements or contracts must be respected. But pacta sunt servanda in
domestic legal orders also implicates a range of caveats related to
theories of agency and unconscionability that have not, it seems, fully
93
translated into the international debt arena.

91. See generally Lienau, supra note 35 (describing the problematic theoretical basis for and the
historical development of the market principle of sovereign debt continuity). This Part draws considerably
from this book.
92. Of course enforcement of particular sovereign debt instruments does interact with and to some
degree depend upon this larger assumption. This is especially the case given the difficulty of enforcing
judgments against sovereign debtors using mechanisms other than reputational sanction.
93. For a consideration of how standard equitable understandings in contract law might translate to
the arena of sovereign debt, see generally Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer,
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Indeed, the background rule of sovereign debt continuity gains
significant power from its popular identity as a market given, with
ostensibly definite effects that can be identified and measured but that
ultimately cannot be changed. This is hardly to say that a consistent
repayment rule has not been criticized or normatively challenged.
Activists and legal scholars have argued that there should be exceptions
to this rule, especially in certain transitional political situations such as
94
post-apartheid South Africa or post-Hussein Iraq. Largely driven by
concerns about justice or fairness, they have proposed (or rather,
resuscitated) an alternative standardthe doctrine of odious debtthat
would allow debt to be cancelled if it either did not benefit the
underlying population or was entered into without the population’s
95
consent. However, development of this doctrine has not moved very far,
at least in part due to the sense that it violates the already-existing and
perhaps unavoidable market standard mandating uniform debt
repayment. Interestingly, the belief in the virtual inevitability of this
repayment ruleand also to some degree in the necessity of this rule for
ongoing cooperation in sovereign lendingseems to be shared across
96
creditors, borrowers, and other major international actors. Even those
successor states that might wish for a different ruleand might be in a
strong moral position to press for the alternative approachtend to
accede to the market narrative. As Robert Howse noted in a study for
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development:
[O]ne of the major policy concerns that has deterred some transitional
regimes from repudiating ‘odious’ debt from the previous regime is that of
reputation in the capital markets; a transitional regime may be concerned
that creditors will not in the future provide access to funds, because they
are unable to distinguish the exceptional political decision to repudiate
debt due to its odiousness from the general creditworthiness of the
97
regime.

In effect, the market principle itselfthe belief that nonpayment will
result in capital market sanctions across all casesseems to be doing a

and Sovereign Debt, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 171 (2007); Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 81 (2007); Robert Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Discussion Paper No. 185, 2007).
94. For a discussion of the South African and Iraqi cases, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 191–92, 210–15;
see also Jai Damle, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 139, 139–41 (2007).
95. The early formulation was first offered by Alexander Sack in 1927. A.-N. Sack, Les Effets des
Transformations des États sur leurs Dettes Publiques et Autres Obligations Financières tome II
157 (1927).
96. For example, a 2003 Financial Times leader noted in light of the Saddam Hussein debt repudiation
discussions: “The principle [being attacked] is sovereign continuitythe idea that governments should honor
debts contracted by predecessors. Without this, there would be no lending to governments.” Lienau, supra
note 35, at 5 (alteration in original).
97. Howse, supra note 93, at 20.
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significant portion of the work in structuring the rules and norms
according to which this global arena functions.
Still, despite its seeming strength, the debt continuity rule should
not be mistaken for an inevitable feature of the financial world. As I
have detailed more fully in previous research, the market principle
narrative supporting the repayment rule is both theoretically problematic
98
and also insufficiently supported by the historical evidence. To begin
with, the framing and understanding of sovereign debt repayment and
reputation as a market principle works in part by propagating the
following three flawed assumptions. First, the dominant approach implies
that although creditors may assess a specific borrower’s political
characteristics through the lens of sovereign risk, judgments about a
borrower’s repayment decisions are not shaped by politics per se. Rather,
they are simply the best objective assessment of a given set of material
facts, and are therefore unchallengeable on the basis of political or moral
principle. The second flawed assumption is that the mechanism of
sovereign reputation itself is assumed to be similarly free from subjective
and historically variable political judgments and, therefore, similarly
immune from challenge. And the third assumption is that all rational
creditors are expected to respond in basically the same way to particular
debt events, suggesting that efforts to understand or reshape their
99
interests would be futile.
But in fact none of these assumptions hold up to closer examination,
which means that the strict debt repayment norm should be more
politically and historically variable than it first appearsmore like other
manmade laws than like the regularities of physics. To begin with, any
discussion of “sovereign” debt is rendered intelligible only by implicitly
incorporating one of the most highly politicized and deeply contested
100
terms in international law and international relations: sovereignty.
Depending on the theory of sovereignty implicitly or explicitly adopted,
the practices of sovereign debt and reputation can be expected to diverge
101
significantly. A theory of sovereignty that considers the population to
be merely subject to whichever government is in power should embrace a
debt continuity norm without much difficulty. After all, democratic voice
and popular benefit are irrelevant under this traditionalist or absolutist
approach. Conversely, if a theory of sovereignty privileging popular

98. See generally Lienau, supra note 35 (explaining the historical and theoretical problems that
arise when the market principle narrative is used to support the repayment rule).
99. Id. at 2–7 (describing the theoretical basis for and the historical development of the market principle
of sovereign debt continuity).
100. See, e.g., Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (1995); Robert Jackson, Sovereignty:
The Evolution of an Idea (2013); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999)
(offering different perspectives on the nature and meaning of sovereignty).
101. See Lienau, supra note 35, at 34–52.
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control or public benefit is accepted, then a debt contract signed by a
nondemocratic governmentparticularly a contract that did not aim to (or
actually) benefit the underlying populationshould not be presumptively
enforceable against successive regimes. Furthermore, creditor uniformity
cannot simply be assumed, given the multiple competing pressures in
debt markets and also the varying political viewpoints that creditors
might reasonably find compelling. In fact, different creditors may
interpretand historically have interpretedthe same politicized debt
102
repudiation in opposing ways.
As with the capital controls example previously discussed, factors
promoting or undermining ideological consensus along these lines should
impact the strength of the market principle and therefore the amount of
policy space actually allowed to state actorsall despite the absence of
103
any recognizable global hard or soft law rule on the issue. In particular,
the degree of consensus supporting debt continuity should impact the
strength of its reputational sanction at any given historical moment. It is
hard to imagine a state being punished for paying back even highly
questionable debt. However, the reputational response to nonpayment
will likely vary with consensus on the market principle, and therefore
with the material and ideational elements that support or undermine that
104
consensus. In periods of relatively uniform support for debt continuity,
states will have less leeway and will be more broadly punished for
refusing to repay even arguably illegitimate debt. Conversely, states may
105
have more policy space when the uniformity is undermined.
This encourages a closer look at the historical development and
potential variability of the market principle itself. Unlike the capital
controls example, in which the IMF plays a particularly dominant role,
there is no apparent hard law shell to house the market principle of debt
continuity. Also unlike the capital controls example, there is a less clear
106
and circumscribed time period that invites closer consideration. Still, it is
possible to recognize the functioning of the debt continuity principle in
the global arena, and even to identify periods in which more or less
107
Although the debt continuity rule plays an
consensus existed.
important function in the global legal ordereffectively constituting an
injunction against debt cancellations on the basis of principleits shaky
theoretical claim to inevitability is joined by a degree of historical

102. For the theoretical argument on creditworthiness, see id. at 26–32.
103. For a discussion on the relevance of consensus to the strength of a reputational compliance
mechanism, see Simmons & Elkins, supra note 4, at 173.
104. For more on the specific interaction between reputation and ideas of sovereign legitimacy, see
Lienau, supra note 35, at 24–28, 34–52.
105. Id. at 29–32.
106. For the capital controls example, see the discussion supra in Part I.B.
107. For a more comprehensive summary of periodization, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 13–15.
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instability in its application. This historical contingency only strengthens
the contention that the debt continuity rule is manmadea social
construction rather than an inevitabilitythough admittedly not in the
deliberately rule-selecting method of law conventionally understood.
So where can we see the rule of debt continuity at work, and where
do we see its weakening? This is somewhat complicated, as the effective
functioning of this market principle results in a series of noneventsstate
actors deciding against debt cancellation, particularly after a regime
change, despite the possibility of a cancellation on the basis of principled
108
claims about sovereign legitimacy. Still, for preliminary insight into its
impact, we can take a closer look at cases of major regime change. Given
that these tend to be associated with arguments about the illegitimacy of
the previous regime, we might reasonably expect these states to consider
109
principled debt cancellation.
Another difficult question is when to begin this historical analysis,
particularly given that shifts in the market principle of debt continuity do
not have as clear a starting point as in the capital controls example. Still,
some guidance can be drawn from the arguments that a state might
present in favor of debt cancellation, particularly given that any claims
grounded in assertions about sovereign legitimacy would have to find an
audience willing to at least consider such arguments. This points to
beginning this analysis in the post-World War I era, when ideas of
sovereign legitimacy related to self-determination and popular control
first became universalized and might reasonably have been more broadly
110
accepted.
Two relatively well-known cases of debt repudiation in the postWorld War I era involve the Soviet Union and Costa Rica. Though the
cases differ in virtually every other respect, both of these countries
repudiated the contracts of previous regimesthose of the tsarist regime
111
and the government of the dictator Federico Tinoco, respectivelyon
the basis of claims about legitimacy. Interestingly, at least in economics
and political science, these casesand particularly the Soviet caseare
sometimes held up to suggest the futility of challenging timeless
112
principles of capital markets. But in fact a closer consideration of these
events demonstrates quite the opposite, showing how creditors can

108. Sovereign default without a claim to principle is, of course, much more common and may also
be subject to reputational sanction. For a general consideration of the role of reputation in enforcing
sovereign debt agreements, see Tomz, supra note 34.
109. For more on case selection for thinking through debt continuity, see Lienau, supra note 35, at
52–55.
110. For further information on the ideological shifts in the post-World War I era, see id. at 59–65.
111. See generally Lienau, supra note 35, at chs. 3, 4 (discussing the political and economic context
and the consequences of these two repudiations, respectively).
112. Michael Tomz, for example, cites a number of commentators from the period in support of this
view. Tomz, supra note 34, at 80.
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reasonably make reputational judgments in favor of post-repudiation
lending, at least under conditions of market competition and ideological
flexibility. The Soviet case in particular has been misinterpreted in the
literature, presented as an example of a strong and universal reputational
113
However, attending to the
sanction for principled repudiation.
historical bank correspondence rather than only to bond float data
demonstrates that private interest did in fact exist in lending to the new
Soviet regime, at least among new American banks eager to compete
114
with established European financiers. The Costa Rican case culminated
in a well-known arbitration in which U.S. Chief Justice William Howard
Taft distinguished between debt contracted for “personal” as opposed to
“legitimate government” purposes, and found that only legitimate debt
115
could survive a regime’s demise to bind the subsequent government.
Notwithstanding the repudiation or the decision in its favor, Costa Rica
was not blocked from capital markets in subsequent years. All of this
goes to demonstrate that, although the market principle of debt
continuity may act as an effective rule today, this rule is hardly inevitable
or unchangeable. Its strength, including through the reputational
mechanism supporting the rule, depends on maintaining a degree of
consensus and in particular a uniform response of disapproval.
What happened in the decades following these notable cases of
repudiation? The absence of similar examples with a muted reputational
response suggests a subsequent strengthening of the market principle of
debt continuity after World War II. Despite regime changes and
repudiations in the cases of China and Cuba, as well as significant
dissatisfaction with expectations of debt repayment elsewhere, any effort
to challenge debt continuity was met with marginalization in international
116
credit markets. But this narrowing of the ideological consensus in
sovereign debt was hardly embedded in apolitical market certainties or
ahistorical creditor preferences. Rather, the departure from the more open
post-World War I moment resulted from changing political structures and
sovereignty norms, as well as from shifts in creditor interactions. The postWorld War II reconstruction of the financial system was led by public
creditors such as the new World Bank, as opposed to the competitive
private creditors of the post-World War I era, who had withdrawn from
international lending after the wave of sovereign defaults during the
Great Depression. And the World Bank promoted sovereign debt
practices that comported with its own financial and operational needs,

113. Id.
114. Lienau, supra note 35, at 88–91.
115. Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law: Arbitration Between Great Britain
and Costa Rica, 18 Am. J. Int’l L. 147, 168 (1924) (providing opinion and award of William H. Taft, Sole
Arbitrator). For a discussion of Taft’s decision, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 109–16.
116. For information on Cuba and China in particular, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 149–53.
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including a strict insistence on debt repayment that helped to regularize
and naturalize debt continuity as a dominant market principle going
117
forward.
When private creditors returned to sovereign lending in the early
1970s, they arrived through a framework of syndicated lending and
multinational branching that undermined the space for more flexible
approaches and further consolidated consensus around a narrow
118
repayment rule. Notably, sovereign states themselves, increasingly
wary of external scrutiny of their internal political and economic choices,
hardly forced an open discussion of political principles in the debt
119
arena. This background affected the subsequent loan restructurings of
the late 1970s and 1980s. In particular, the systemic risk posed by the
private banks’ interconnected loansand the banks’ interaction with
public actors such as the IMF and the U.S. Treasuryresulted in a joint
approach to sovereign borrowers that limited the space for alternative
120
approaches to debt. Thus, despite being grounded in very particular
historical moments, these shifts granted the rule of debt repayment an air
of inevitability into the 1990s, and meant that even clearly revolutionary
governments in Nicaragua, Iran, the Philippines, and South Africa
121
ultimately acknowledged the debts of their predecessors.
This history demonstrates the power and resilience of the market
principle of debt continuity, but also suggests that it is not necessarily an
inevitable feature of the global legal order. Its strength has depended on the
existence of consensus among market participants and other international
actorsa consensus that was in turn shaped over the last century by
political actors, broader ideological shifts, and changing public and private
creditor structures. The post-World War I cases, which underscore how
lending can function even in the absence of this supposed market given,
further suggest that the rule is hardly essential for a workable sovereign
debt regime. Alternative approaches incorporating ideas of illegitimate
debt and allowing for limited cancellation have emerged historically and
could function more fully in the future. Indeed, the post-Cold War era
has witnessed the international move toward a discourse of governance,
democracy, and human rights, which has made its way into the language
(if not fully the practice) of even major economic organizations and
122
private creditor groups. Although expectations of uniform repayment
still dominate, new modes of creditor interaction and new sources of
international capital have further enabled flexibility in certain cases. For

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

For further information on the World Bank’s role, see id. at 126–44.
See, e.g., id. at 155–60.
Id. at 163–65.
See, e.g., id. at 166–71.
Id. at 174–92.
For a discussion on this shifting language, see id. at 194–200.
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example, recent debt discussions in Iraq, Ecuador, and even Europe have
123
brought arguments about illegitimate debt more clearly to light.
Thus, the sovereign debt continuity example highlights how a market
principle, supported by a reputational sanction mechanism, may limit a
state’s policy space and undermine the development of alternative
doctrines even in the absence of any official global directive. However,
this example also demonstrates the mistake in any suggestion that this is
an inevitable and ahistorical set of constraints rather than a product of
the interactions and decisions of various historically situated actors. At a
more general or theoretical level, it further shows how market principles
mayin addition to working through the background of conventional
hard and soft law or by countering officially existing lawindependently
constitute law-like rules themselves. These market givens can become a
powerful part of the global legal order through multiple mechanisms with
varying degrees of formality, all while remaining in the background and
escaping the scrutiny accorded to “law” itself.
D. Definitional Complexities
Although the preceding examples help to demonstrate the potential
impact of market principles, they also point to another key feature of this
category of rules or constraintsnamely, its variability. While I have
defined market principles as collective beliefs about how markets work
as an objective matter, this definition immediately raises several difficult
questions: How can a market principle be simultaneously stable enough
to generate an impact but also ultimately changeable? Is it always the
case that there is a concrete market principle relevant to every issue
area? This Article does not at all suggest that every idea held about
markets is sufficiently strong or stable to be a market principle, or that
there will always be a market principle on point. Certainly, there could
be issue areas for which no law or rule of any sort holds, in which case an
actor’s policy space or range of potential behavior is much greater,
whether for good or ill. Similarly, there may be times during which no
market principle seems to apply, even if one existed in years prior. It is
also possible that certain geographic regions or sub-communities are not
124
subject to a market principle that otherwise appears to be global. My
contention is not that the legal order overflows with clearly delineated
and broadly accepted market principles; they are not simply synonymous
with individually held ideas of market functioning. However, market
principles may have a powerful impact at certain moments, for particular
issue areas, and perhaps in certain communities. The goal of this Article,

123. For a discussion of these examples, see id. at 210–25.
124. One can imagine the relative bifurcation of the globe during the Cold War as leading to an
only partial application of market principles, for example.

Lienau-68.3.doc (Do Not Delete)

570

5/25/2017 8:39 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:541

as detailed more fully in Part III.A, is to encourage lawyers to be
attentive to the role and impact of market principles when they do
emerge and to incorporate them into legal analysis and activity when
relevant.
Of course, this raises the further question of how to know when
market principles have in fact emerged. How collectively held must these
beliefs about market functioning be to count? Who should hold or
transmit them? And is there not always contestation and controversy in
any supposedly collective belief about the market? One great virtue of
law, traditionally understood, is its cognizability; it involves a relatively
straightforward promulgation of guidelines by some definite body
125
claiming authority. Market principles may be relatively clear in their
directive content and even broadly shared without being obviously
promulgated or disseminated by a determinate institution or individual.
This means that the contours of the collectivity holding the belief are
necessarily flexible and historically contingent, roughly encompassing a
126
community of understanding and action around a particular issue area.
This also means, as discussed further in Part III.C, that questions about
rulemaking and rulemakers are inevitably complicated. The particular
mechanisms by which rules are formulated, transmitted, and enforced
will almost certainly vary across different market principles. That said, as
demonstrated by the preceding examples, the international institutions
and epistemic or expert communities discussed in other arenas of global
127
governance will often play a part.
In addition, it is absolutely the case that there will be controversy
and contestation about particular market principlesthe debt continuity
and capital mobility rules had detractors, for example, even as they
continued to shape action and reputational consequences. Indeed, this
contestation is present for any collective belief about how things work as
an ostensibly objective matter, be it in the social or natural sciences. As
such, it is difficult to specify in advance the threshold beyond which a
market principle ceases to exist and becomes merely a collective
discussion or disagreement about various market ideas in a given issue
area. As discussed more fully in Part III.D, the ideological consensus that
reputationally supports a market principle can be fractured to the point

125. For a classic delineation of the features of a legal order, see the discussion of Lon Fuller in
Part II.B.
126. This draws roughly from an understanding of norms generally as expectations of appropriate
behavior shared by a community of actors. For a broader consideration of how norms, discourse, and
expectations interact and relate to concepts of power and interest, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 15–17.
This approach also draws from understandings of epistemic communities in political science and
sociology. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 Int’l Org. 1, 35 (1992); Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations:
The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations (Barry Buzan & Richard Little eds., 2005).
127. See sources cited supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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that it stops constraining actor behavior, thus reopening policy space that
may have been closed. Indeed, part of the goal of this Article is to
encourage precisely the kind of legal attention and controversy that might
undermine those market principles that individuals find normatively
lacking. Therefore, as with many rulesfrom capital mobility to the
Fourteenth Amendmentit rests with those studying and applying the
rule to assess its contours and strength, and even to decide whether it is
determinate enough at a particular moment to warrant attention.
These questions on line-drawing could (and perhaps should)
continue indefinitely. And a more definitive set of answers delineating
precise boundaries would no doubt be far more satisfying. But such
clarity would be disingenuous and premature from my perspective, as I
intend this Article to be a first cut at these concepts and issues and an
invitation to further study by other scholars. Ultimately, as with my
understanding of the concept of law itself, the boundaries of the market
principle category are not perfectly precise, and its content is somewhat
flexible. Still, this framework is worth further consideration given the
power that market principles can have in the global legal order when
they are sufficiently identifiable and determinate.
II. Why “Law”?
Even if one accepts the importance of market principles in shaping
facets of international law and coordinated global practice, it may still be
a stretch to refer to these market givens as of the legal order itself, as
opposed to just an external constraint or element affecting that order.
What is the threshold for calling something laweven hidden lawbefore
we move into the realm of implausible overinclusivity? I begin this Part by
noting that the category of law itself has hardly been stable and that,
particularly in the international arena, many scholars and practitioners
have struggled to defineand have ultimately chosen to expandthe
scope of their attention and practice. Although market principles currently
stand outside these already flexible global boundaries, this Article suggests
that they too belong on this continuum of global law, especially given that
their impact can be as important as more conventionally understood
“law.” It further argues that this categorization is plausible because
market principles tend to have many of the characteristics that we
associate with the conceptual category of law, although of course they
are not self-consciously promulgated as law.
I want to emphasize that the goal here is not to determine the
nature of law as a general philosophical matter or to classify market
principles as a type of law out of fidelity to an imagined essential concept
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of law. Although this Article refers to Lon Fuller’s frequently-used
definition of legal standards and to the work of other legal philosophers,
this is not to elevate or enshrine these particular characterizations as
definitive. Furthermore, this Article does not conceive of the legal order
as a binary in which there is a clear dividing line between law and notlaw. Friedrich Kratochwil’s use of Wittgensteinian understandings of
language in his characterization of law is apt here: Law as a concept can
be understood as a family resemblance. Like a rope, it is “made up of
many strings without one string, representing the core, going through the
129
whole length.” Kratochwil further notes that law is “a language game in
which different exemplars exhibit different features rather than one
130
‘essential characteristic.’” Drawing from this definition, my aim here is
to bring market principles within the family of those politically
constructed directives and rules that we generally understand to be part
of global law.
It is important to reiterate that bringing these market givens into the
ambit of law does not necessarily mean that they are desirable elements
of the legal order or that they should be enforceable by courts. Certainly,
many rules are conceived of as part of law even though their normative
and source validity are heavily contested. Rather, as will become clearer
in Part III, the principal goal of this Article is to argue thatparticularly
given the relatively flexible and inclusive understandings of global law
already prevalentmarket principles belong not at the margins of, but
rather squarely within, the field of legal vision, criticism, and activity.
A. The Expanding Global Legal Order
To begin with, how strictly delineated and how binary is the
contemporary understanding of the global legal order? Recent decades
have seen an expansion of the governance activities understood to fall
within the scope of “international law” and therefore clearly within the
purview of international lawyers and legal scholars. Traditionally, the
sources of international law, as laid out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice (“the ICJ Statute”), include treaties,
customary international law (evidenced by state practice accompanied by
a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris), and “general principles of law

128. This would, in the words of Friedrich Kratochwil, “mistakenly assume that concepts ‘work’ by
reference rather than by their link to other concepts and to practices that authorize, forbid, or require a
certain conduct.” Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role
and Rule of Law 53 (2014). Acknowledging a conceptual debt to Richard Rorty, Kratochwil notes that such
attempts “derive from a false notion of language as a simple mirror of the ‘world out there.’” Id. at 53.
129. Id. at 53 (characterizing Ludwig Wittgenstein’s rope example). For more on the idea of family
resemblance as a way to think through the notion or concept of a “game,” see Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1968), ¶¶ 66–67.
130. Kratochwil, supra note 128, at 74.
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131

recognized by civilized nations.” The boundaries, content, and force of
each of these sources of canonical international law are controversial in
their own right. But, even when criticized, they are recognized as legal
materials and questions, with a potentially significant impact mediated or
framed through legal mechanisms and legal argument, and thus properly
deserving the attention of lawyers.
That said, these traditional sources are hardly the only rule forms now
anointed with the label “law.” Legal scholars, along with students of other
disciplines, have directed considerable thought to governance forms that
do not result from the explicit and high-level state activity traditionally
associated with international law but that nonetheless generate powerful
rules across important issue areas. As part of this research, the lawmaking
activities of international organizations, effectively independent of their
132
state members, have been extensively studied and criticized. Scholars
have also assessed the rulemaking that exists on a smaller scale than the
major multilateral conventions, constituting forms of “minilateral”
133
cooperation more “modest in size, formality, and even inclusiveness.”
The important role of “soft law” informal guidelines and codes of conduct,
which are not necessarily enforceable in their own right, and which may not
134
even mandate action, is well-acknowledged. Attention has been paid to
the role of government networks in the formulation of such guidelines and
135
in providing the foundations for global governance. The codes and
conventions of entirely private actors and networks have been studied as
part of the legal order, from the medieval lex mercatoria to the private
136
conventions promulgated by today’s multinational corporations. And

131. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(a)–(c). The statute further clarifies that
“subsidiary” means for determining or interpreting the content of traditional international law may also
include the “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations.” Id. art. 38(1)(d).
Although technically these sources are listed as applicable to the International Court of Justice, in
practice the statute is generally followed by other courts as well. See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an
International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429, 482–83 (2003).
132. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2006). This connects to
a broader tradition in political science investigating the role of international organizations in global
governance. See generally Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International
Organizations in Global Politics (2004); Karns & Mingst, supra note 28.
133. Chris Brummer, Minilateralism: How Trade Alliances, Soft Law and Financial Engineering
are Redefining Economic Statecraft 2 (2014).
134. See, e.g., all sources cited supra note 132; Informal International Lawmaking (Joost Pauwelyn
et al. eds., 2012).
135. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004) (providing a paradigmatic
example).
136. Lex mercatoria can be defined as:
[A] body of oral, customary mercantile law which developed in medieval Europe and was
administered quite uniformly across Europe by merchant judges, adjudicating disputes between
merchants. In the contemporary world, some scholars believe that there exists a modern lex
mercatoria, defined to include certain transnational trade usages and commercial customs
recognized internationally by the mercantile community.
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scholars and proponents of global administrative law, which aims to
promote the accountability of global administrative bodies, openly admit
that the “law” moniker in their context “diverges from, and can be sharply
in tension with the classical models of consent-based interstate
137
international law and most models of national law.” In short, rules and
norms formulated at multiple levels of decisionmaking, devised by many
types of actors, and involving varying degrees of formality and
enforceability have been incorporated into our understanding of global
law and the legal order.
To be sure, not everyone is pleased with these developments. As
noted in this Article’s conclusion, scholars have highlighted the risks
involved in overexpanding the category of international law. Certainly
the normative desirability of such “law,” along with its enforceability
through particular courts or other adjudicatory and enforcement
institutions, remain important questions. But it is clear that both the realworld practice of rule generation and the scholarly study of arguably
legal forms have expanded. Setting aside questions of desirability or
enforcement for the moment, seriously addressing this new, possibly
lawmaking, range of activity has improved our understanding of the
global arena.
B. Nondeliberate Rules in the International Arena
How do market principles fit in here and why can they plausibly be
understood as a distinct but related element of this expanded global legal
order? Or, in other words, why is it the case that our expanded
understanding of global law and lawmaking has not gone far enough?
While the terms “belief,” “rule,” and “law” have been used fairly loosely
in this Article, they deserve greater specification. I have already clarified
that the collective beliefs about markets that interest me here are causal
beliefsbeliefs about how markets work as an objective matter. In my
view, such a shared belief can form the core of a directive or rule, with a
“rule” understood simply as a standard that guides conduct. This
conversion or translation happens quietly and naturally, rather than
through explicit rule formation. As noted previously, the collectively
held belief that sovereign states that fail to repay sovereign debt will
harm their reputation, even despite political or moral arguments that

Lex Mercatoria Law and Legal Definition, USLegal.com, https://definitions.uslegal.com/l/lex-mercatoria/
(last visited Mar. 11, 2017). The nature and scope of lex mercatoria and its relationship to earlier historical
forms that might have existed remains a subject of debate. See generally Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many
Livesand Facesof Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 169 (2008) (considering the uses of history in understandings of lex mercatoria).
137. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 23, 26
(2009); see Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 10 (2006).
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favor cancellation, is a market principle that has proven powerful in
contemporary international finance. This belief generates a concomitant
rule or standard“Repay sovereign debt”that effectively guides the
action of states and serves as a basis for judgment and evaluation. It even
includes a built-in sanction: “Repay sovereign debt, or suffer
reputational harm.”
The point here is not that market principles directly generate (or
are) technical or hard “law” themselves. This certainly is not the case,
particularly if one comes anywhere close to accepting the definition
found in the ICJ Statutethough, as just highlighted, global law seems to
have already escaped these traditionalist bounds. These market
principles are not soft law either, in the sense of informal codes or
guidelines established by a subset of state, non-state, or sub-state actors.
Still, the market principles I am interested in do something akin to legal
work, acting in many ways like law, though without the deliberate
formulation. While there is considerable controversy surrounding the
nature of law, legal rules, and legal norms, among the most widely
employed characterizations is Lon Fuller’s understanding of the rule of
law as involving eight core principles. In Fuller’s view, legal standards
should be: (1) general (in that they are generally applicable rules as opposed
to one-time directives); (2) promulgated (publicly known); (3) clear;
(4) prospective; (5) consistent (that is, not in conflict with other legal
138
This basic
standards); (6) satisfiable; (7) stable; and (8) applied.
understanding is echoed with various permutations across multiple
schools of jurisprudence, though it is admittedly an ideal. Indeed, any
legal standard will almost certainly violate one or more of these
elements, for example, by being interpretively ambiguous, not in
complete concert with other legal rules, subject to change, and less than
perfectly followed or enforced. Any law can be challenged to a degree
without losing its basic legal character, though of course there may be
line-drawing questions on when a rule is violated so frequently as to no
longer exist.
Accepting Fuller’s basic characterization for the purposes of this
Article, however, at least some market principles share many of these
characteristics and function in a law-like mannercoordinating and
constituting social interaction and guiding actor conduct in ways that
satisfy many and perhaps almost all of the characteristics of the rule of
law. To return to sovereign debt continuity, the rule “Repay sovereign
debt” is recognized as general, well-known, clear, prospective, satisfiable,
seemingly stable over time, and appliedat least in the sense that a
reputational cost is expected to result from its violation. This rule is
arguably consistent with other legal standards, at least with a simplified

138. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33–39 (rev. ed. 1969).
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version of the basic rules of contract understood to dominate the global
economy. There is no public promulgation as a law, which this Article
fully acknowledgesthese principles are “law in hiding,” after all.
Still, even if, as a narrow definitional matter, there are grounds for
suggesting that market principles may have law-like characteristics, this
understanding is perhaps overexpansive, lacking any real limiting factor.
If this is the analytical mechanism for translating a causal belief (via its
embedded conduct-guiding standard) into a rule in a legal order, then
virtually any causal belief or any understanding about how the world
works can be a law. This brings to mind the saying: “Gravity. It’s Not Just
139
a Good Idea. It’s the Law!” This statement is absurd (and amusing) in
part because of the implication that gravity is an idea that can be
subjectively accepted or rejectedrather than a mere fact or
unchangeable forceand also because of the suggestion that our
compliance with the rule of gravity would be enhanced if this rule were to
be understood or enacted as law.
Even beyond “rules” or “laws” that command action over which we
have no control“comply with gravity” being the paradigmatic
examplenot all directives aimed at real actionable choices should
necessarily be recognized as rules, much less as laws. Andrei Marmor
points out that rules should be distinguished from generally recognized
reasons or strategies underpinning a particular action. He offers the game
of chess as an example: “[O]ne can say, ‘Don’t ever move the king when . . .’;
and this sounds very much like a rule. But the formulation is potentially
misleading. . . . When you point out a sound strategy . . . . [y]ou just sum up
140
the reasons that apply independently, in a rule-like formulation.” In a
similar vein, Kratochwil highlights that a given category of rules “might
simply embody experiential knowledge concerning the causal nexus
among natural phenomena and the likelihood of attaining one’s goals in
given circumstances. The obvious examples for this category are
141
‘instruction-type’ rules such as ‘do not plant tomatoes before 15 April.’”
In short, these “rules” are actually only implicit summaries of facts and the
ramifications of contrary action in the face of such facts: Assuming ABC
goal, do not take EFG action or face XYZ consequences.
Given these distinctions, why are “repay sovereign debt” and “don’t
impose capital controls” not more like one of these aforementioned
examplesnot so inevitable as gravity, in that the possibility of contrary
action does exist, but nonetheless still just reformulations of knowledge

139. There are many variations on this themefor example, “Obey Gravity. It’s the Law!”but the
original phrase is claimed by Gerry Mooney in 1977. The History of the Gravity Poster, Gerry Mooney
Studio, http://www.thegravityposter.com/historyof_01.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).
140. Marmor, supra note 11, at 14–15.
141. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs 72–73 (1989).
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about near-natural phenomena? Or, put differently, why are market
principles plausibly understood as “rules” that might credibly be part of
an emerging (but ultimately changeable) global legal order? As Scott
Shapiro notes of the gravity example, “[t]he joke works not only because
it is crazy to admonish people to obey the laws of physics, but equally
because it isn’t crazy to insist that they heed the laws of political
142
institutions.” This political, constructed element is crucial, and if we
relax our definition of political institutions to encompass the motley
array of rule- and norm-generating actors in the global arena, it remains
highly applicable.
Indeed, central to this Article’s argument is the contention that
market givens are, for the most part, less like rules of physics (or chess or
tomato planting) and more like the rules constructed by political
institutionsalbeit without the process, intent, or decree-like language
usually associated with traditional legal rules. This is likely to be the case
even when a market principle is understood to be objective and inevitable
at any given moment. Of course, market principles can certainly be
understood to exist on a continuum, varying across the spectrum of
inevitability or permanencetake as a more stable example the “law” of
supply and demand, which observes that prices rise with increased
demand, assuming supply is held constant. But my contention is that the
rebuttable presumption ought to favor understanding these market
principles as socially and politically formed over time, and as giving rise
to ultimately manmade (if not self-awarely chosen) rules in the global
arena. Such constructedness may seem fairly uncontroversial when we
take a closer look at any particular topic, as suggested by the capital
controls and debt continuity examples. Yet the ways that these
constructed beliefs fit into the map of other international rule formsthe
ways in which they can direct, block, interpret, or otherwise act in a lawlike mannerremain overlooked. In other words, when viewed from a
more traditional legal lens, these market givens still fade into the
background.
In an important essay in the field of socio-economics, Michel Callon
argues that it is “wrong to talk of laws or, worse still, of the law of the
market. There exist only temporary, changing laws associated with
143
specific markets.” This insight is in many ways accurate but, as in so
many fields, it uses law largely as an under-specified metaphor. Part of
my argument is that we need to take this use of the term “law” much
more seriouslythat lawyers in particular should ask about the ways in
which market principles actually function as a frequently silent element
of the legal order and therefore should be uncovered and studied as such.

142. Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 201 (2011).
143. Laws of the Markets 47 (Michel Callon ed., 1998).
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If we focus on this broader picture of law, then the continuities between
market principles and other international rule forms become more
apparent. If a market principle is indeed more like a rule of political
institutionsgeneral, well-known, clear, prospective, satisfiable, applied,
and stable for a time, but ultimately socio-politically constructed and
historically contingentin other words, a law of sortsthen contemplating
how it works in the global legal order is sensical and perhaps even called for.
Indeed, to the extent that the principle, along with its associated practices, is
not acknowledged to be part of the legal order, it retains an element of legal
character while escaping the scrutiny and challenge usually accorded to legal
rules, acting effectively as a “law in hiding.”
III. The Ramifications of Expanding “Law”
If it is plausible to think of market principles as within the boundaries
of the international legal order, what are the consequences of doing so? As
acknowledged in the Introduction, my motivation derives in part from an
interest in the ramifications of this analytical recasting. Indeed, the
expansion of law in the international arena to include less traditional legal
categories, just noted in Part II.A, seems to have resulted in part from the
strategic or political considerations of international scholars and
144
practitioners. Speaking of the translation or reframing of the normative
concept of transparency into a principle relevant to international law,
Andrea Bianchi notes that:
The “translation” is compelled by the well-known hostility of the lawyerly
world towards what positivists would call “extra-legal considerations.”
Unless something is expressed in a form that is couched in legal terms, it
has a slim chance of being accepted within the discipline. Hence the need
to qualify as “principles” those concepts that would otherwise have no
145
standing in the world of legal imagery and representation.

So what does it really mean to have standing in the world of legal
representationas a normative principle or as a rule to be handled in a
legal manner by lawyers and legal scholars? Or, put differently, what are
the more specific ramifications of analyzing a class of market directives as
“law” and suggesting that these market principles be understood as central
to the global legal order? Even if this discursive move is plausible, is it
desirable?
This Part argues that understanding how market givens can act as a
type of law would open them up to an important range of criticism and

144. As Benedict Kingsbury points out, “concepts of law may have political significance. . . . The choice
among such approaches is a political choice with political implications.” Kingsbury, supra note 137, at 26; see
Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and
Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 401 (2002).
145. Andrea Bianchi, On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International Law, in
Transparency in International Law 6 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013).
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analysis that they might otherwise avoid. This could work in part by
encouraging lawyers to adopt a more complete understanding of how
market principles may be among the actual (if not always obvious) rules
facing themselves and their clients, and so to direct toward them the
scrutiny and the activism generally accorded to law. Including market
principles within legal analysis might also contribute to the empirical
study of such principles, given that lawyers tend to have a distinct
approach to cases and case studies as compared to social scientists. In
addition, this shift could place pressure on normatively problematic
market principles by encouraging their assessment against value
frameworks associated with lawincluding frameworks of legitimate
rulemaking, accountability, and the appropriate hierarchy of conflicting
legal norms. This type of legal scrutiny might undermine the power of
market principles by fracturing the ideological consensus that supports
their reputational sanctioning mechanisms. Finally, this Part turns to the
possible risk involved in labeling market principles as law, in particular
the risk of granting them a degree of legitimacy that they do not
necessarily deserve. Ultimately, because of the very different kind of
norm entrepreneurship likely to be associated with support for market
principles, I contend that this risk does not outweigh the likely benefits
of thinking about market principles as part of the legal order.
A. Broadening the Lawyer’s Field of Vision
Thus far, I have spoken fairly generally about the need to direct
toward market principles the same scrutiny and analysis accorded to law
as it is more conventionally understood. But what might this kind of
application or scrutiny look like? To begin with the obvious, lawyers tend
to study, practice, and criticize law. And the identification of something
as law triggers several important questions: How does this fit into the
constellation of other laws or rules in this area? Who is the lawmaker for
this rule? Is the lawmaker properly authorized and accountable? And, if
we are dissatisfied with the rule in question, how might it be changed?
H.L.A. Hart emphasized the key connection in any legal order between
primary rules, which can direct action and guide conductfor example,
“stop at a red light”and secondary rules, which include the procedures
146
for making, modifying, or enforcing those rules. This analysis does not

146. See generally H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law 91–99 (3d ed. 2012). Of course Hart himself seems
not to have characterized “law” as existing in the absence of “a union of primary rules of obligation with such
secondary rules,” which are not immediately apparent in market principles. Id. at 94. Still, part of the
argument is to suggest that market principles can map onto many of these more generally accepted modes of
legal analysesand that such mapping would illuminate our understanding of how they workeven if the
analytical frameworks may need to be modified somewhat. See Mehrdad Payandeh, The Concept of
International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart, 21 Eur. J. Int’l L. 967 (2010) (providing an analysis
that applies Hart’s jurisprudence to international law as it is more generally understood today).
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smoothly translate to market principles, which are not chosen as law by a
clearly identifiable actor. The primary rules can be difficult to discern,
and identifying or thinking through secondary rulesincluding the
procedures for changing these market principlesmight be even more
difficult.
Still, a good lawyer should comprehend the full constellation of
rules relevant to a given issue area. If market principles are indeed acting
as a type of under-identified law in the global arena, then this kind of
analysis is necessary for a more complete understanding of the actual
rules shaping actor behavior and distributional outcomes. Identifying
primary rules for market principles may require a degree of uncovering,
as previously demonstrated by the examples in Part I. But this project of
explicit identification is more likely to happen if lawyers and legal
scholars start to conceive of market principles as part of the field of law
itself. Along these lines, an initial mapping or identification of the
relevant rules for an issue area might start by asking: What are the
formal rules, including those hard law rules understood according to
traditional doctrines or sources? In addition, what are the informal or
soft law rules, whether they are generated by public or private authority?
And also, what are the relevant market principlescollective beliefs
about how markets work, as an ostensibly objective matterthat
themselves generate or imply directives for actors? It seems that this may
already happen informally in many arenas. For example, returning to a
consideration of the rules governing capital mobility, we might first look
at the IMF Articles of Agreement, which clearly allow governments to
limit the convertibility of capital accounts, as I discuss in Part I.B. But
any advisor that stopped here would rightly be accused of a formalistic
misunderstanding of the actually existing rules on the ground. The actual
rule on capital mobility might include, at a given moment, a market
principle that effectively blocks or sanctions capital controls,
notwithstanding the countervailing hard law technically on the books.
In response to any claims about the inevitability or special strength of
this market principle, a savvy lawyer might have her doubts. She may well
share the fairly obvious, commonsense background knowledge that one
period’s objective market principle (and one era’s objective knowledge of
any sort) is likely to be historically contingent, socially constructed, and
eventually overturned. But, so long as we accept that market principles
remain primarily the provenance of other disciplineseconomics,
economic sociology, and perhaps political sciencethat background
knowledge does not translate out of the recesses of the lawyerly mind into
the foreground, where it might have a more substantial impact on one’s
work in the legal world.
And what kind of impact might that be? A wise legal advisor,
recognizing and interpreting the full array of primary rules in a particular
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issue area, will probably recommend technically complying with the
rules, or at least will ensure a full understanding of the consequences of a
violation, regardless of whether those rules take the form of hard law,
soft law, or market principles. But a sophisticated and long-term advocate
for a particular client or for a particular viewpoint probably should not
stop there. An additional step might be to take the perspective of an
aspiring law-changer as well, which is of course a kind of norm
entrepreneur (or, to use a less flattering term, a lobbyistindeed, the
overlap between lobbyists and lawyers can hardly be an accident). The
analytical consequence is then to ask: If a particular rule, including a
particular market principle, does not fall in line with my preferred position,
how might it be changed? Who are the relevant lawmakers here, both the
obvious ones and those working behind the scenes? What are the
underlying economic and political structures that prevent a modification
of the rule, and how might those be dealt with? These inquiries, a type of
directed investigation into certain secondary rules, should be relevant
regardless of the kind of law or rule under investigation.
Of course, identifying the lawmakers and the underlying constraining
structures for a given law or rule is never easy, and it certainly would not
be any easier for market principles understood as law. Furthermore, this
goal points to questions of power, politics, and the development of
organizational expertise and processesquestions central to disciplines
other than law, in particular that of political science. But law and lawyers
have always used these insights for their own purposes, turning to the
social sciences in furtherance of lawyerly goals and folding those insights
into legal projects, including the project of identifying and targeting
levers for change.
B. Another Empirical Look at Market Principles
Still, is the legal field only drawing from these other disciplines or
can it also offer something to empirical study? In my view, the project of
identifying the underlying social construction and historical contingency
of market principles, which is of interest to certain variants of social
science, could use the eyes of a lawyerly advocate as well. This is
particularly the case because, during certain periods in the social science
disciplines, the greatest rewards have gone to those focused on developing
broadly applicable explanatory theories. This trend has tended to include
an emphasis on parsimonious explanationthose explanations capable of
explaining a large amount of data with a relatively simple theory and fewer
147
assumptions. Although this approach to theory development has

147. See Jack S. Levy, Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the
Analysis of International Relations, in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the
Study of International Relations 39–84 (Colin Elman & Miriam Fendius Elman eds., 2001) (discussing
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produced incredibly important work, it can also encourage or prefer
methodologies and findings that emphasize regularities instead of
anomalies. And market principles, of course, can be understood as a type
of parsimonious explanation of how markets regularly work, with
embedded directives for actor behavior. These market givens can thus
derive validation from particular social science frameworks, and any
tendency within social science to reward findings of market principles
may inadvertently bolster them as seemingly inevitable. In privileging
research geared toward regularities, such an approach in the social
sciences might overlook the information that could be mined from a
closer consideration of anomalous and exceptional casesinformation
about how a regularity or rule was made or reinforced in the first place,
through the work of particular actors or the impact of specific ideational
and material structures. These studies may thus neglect information
about potential levers for eventually changing that rule.
By contrast, legal work tends to be attuned not only to understanding
the map of legal rules for an issue, but also to actively finding and
investigating the cases that seem to be an exception to the rule, or that
suggest the possibility of an alternative, inchoate rule that might better
serve a preferred position. An anomalous case is valuable precisely
because it is the exception and, as such, provides insight into the set of
principles and perhaps the constellation of interests that support a
surprising outcome in a particular case. At least for this mode of legal
analysis and advocacy, the goal is not only to recognize and apply the
laws but also to understandand perhaps to challengethe conceptual
and material apparatus supporting one outcome rather than another.
Especially given research trends in the social sciences, then, greater
attention by lawyers to how market principles act as law could thus
enrich not only the lawyer’s own understanding of the global legal order
but also provide empirical insights relevant to international economic
relations more generally. A full understanding of market principles is
important enough to deserve close analysis through multiple disciplinary
lenses and could benefit significantly from an advocacy mindset.
C. Questions of Lawmaking, Accountability, and
Value Congruence
Furthermore, attention by lawyers to market principles can also raise
important normative questions about accountability and value congruence
148
that have been relegated to the sidelines of other disciplines. The

how these methodological issues concerning historical developments are approached in history and political
science); id. at 54–58 (discussing the methodological issues in particularly thorough detail).
148. This is not to say that law is “inherently moral,” and indeed any general theoretical discussion of
normativity in the legal sphere is fraught. New Essays on the Normativity of Law (Stefano Bertea &
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identification of a phenomenon or rule as legal tends to trigger important
scrutiny not only about who the lawmaker is or how the law has
developed, but also about whether the law (and perhaps the lawmaker) is
actually appropriate or fully deserving of respect and adherence. Rule
forms including soft or informal law have recently been scrutinized along
these lines, following upon the expanded scope of international law
discussed in Part II.A. For example, a volume focused on informal
international law has sought to “draw attention to a phenomenon that is
omnipresent in global governance, and yet seems largely neglected by
149
international lawyers.” The project was motivated by the Hague Institute
for the Internationalisation of Law’s request for a study on the question of
“[h]ow forms of informal international public policy-making can be made
150
more democratic and accountable.” The standards for judgment in this
type of legal scrutiny vary depending on the analyst, but recent analyses
have drawn from the approaches of global administrative law and
151
international public authority, for example.
Of course, market principles do not benefit from having more or
less identifiable rulemakers who deliberately select guidelines, which
would be helpful in asking questions about accountability and legitimacy.
Still, it should be possible to think through who actually develops,
formulates, and transmits a given market principle, and to think through
where this process could be most subject to pressure. Such a project is
distinct from that of this Article, but some preliminary questions and
qualifications are worth raising. One temptation might be to challenge
(or dismiss) the social science disciplines whose models and findings can
come to be understood as market principles. But this would hardly be
warranted or useful, particularly as a central virtue of these fields is their
explicit interest in challenging and falsifying the causal beliefs and
explanations proposed by others. More importantly, as Ngaire Woods
points out in her study of the IMF and World Bank, there are problems
with any suggestion that “a new and better Washington consensus applied
by the institutions could rectify their alleged wrongdoing . . . . What they
152
do is not just a product of how good their economics is or isn’t.” And
although this points to politics and power in thinking through the
development of market principles, it is important not to oversimplify on

George Pavlakos eds., 2011) (providing an example of a relatively recent volume that covers several
strands of legal philosophy on the general topic).
149. Informal International Lawmaking, supra note 134, at 1.
150. Id. at 2. Also see Chris Brummer’s discussion of similar issues in international financial law as
“soft law.” Brummer, supra note 133, at 327, 337–42.
151. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 15 (2005); Armin von Bogdandy et al., From Public International to International Public
Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority (Working Paper, Sept. 18,
2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2662391.
152. Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers 2 (2006).
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this front eitherthough it is never wrong to say “power matters,” it is
153
also rarely especially insightful.
Instead, for any particular market principle, more fine-grained
questions about bureaucracies, political institutions, market structures,
ideational frameworks, expert and epistemic communities, and individual
154
actors may all be relevant to different degrees. The constellation of
pertinent features will likely be unique to any given rule, though there
could also be common themes and actorsthe international financial
institutions, credit rating agencies, and other formal and informal
governance bodies, for example. Indeed, this dynamic of specificity and
commonality should already be familiar from case studies of hard and
155
soft law in a number of international economic areas. Furthermore,
many of these institutions are already under study by legal scholars,
including many of those scholars discussed in Part IV of this Article. The
goal here is to enlarge that realm of study to include an investigation not
only of pressure points and possible accountability mechanisms for
explicitly selected guidelines, but also of how to translate these questions
to the processes by which market principles are adopted and emerge as
directives for actor behavior.
In addition to considerations of lawmaking and accountability,
scrutiny by lawyers and legal scholars would likely involve analytical
frameworks that raise normatively inflected questions about rule conflict
and value congruence. For example, international law scholarship has
focused significantly on questions of norm hierarchy and on the difficulty
of reconciling rules that emerge out of disparate or fragmented legal
156
regimes and institutions. This focus on hierarchy and on the question of

153. For a discussion of the role and meaning of power and interest in norm construction, with a
focus on the sovereign debt context, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 15–17.
154. This Article’s goal is not to lay out a comprehensive view or general theory of where market
principles come from or how they change, which would be an impossible task (not to mention antithetical
to the general spirit of my argument). As should be clear from the capital controls and debt continuity
examples, the mechanisms by which particular market principles are initially constructed or transform can
vary significantly. Certain market principles may develop, solidify, or change fairly slowly, involving
generational shifts of ideas or relatively gradual changes in underlying market structure. Sovereign debt
continuity, perhaps, provides an example along these lines. Others may alter more quickly, reflecting a
change in the expert opinions or bureaucratic structures central to idea generation in a given area, as
seems to have been the case with capital controls in the late 1980s through the early 2000s. Just as with the
development of any other type of law, then, both political agency and broader structural issues are very
likely to be part of the picture in any instance of the development and change of market principles.
155. For example, see the cases considered in Informal International Lawmaking, supra note 134.
156. Other legal scholarship that could be relevant in this context discusses the phenomenon of
fragmentationthe development of multiple legal issues, institutions, and norms, which may overlap but
which operate independently and potentially according to separate logics. There is significant disagreement
about how to characterize fragmentation and also about the degree to which this is problematic. But it does
seem that the analytical framework of fragmentation has helped to shed light on an array of specialized or
individualized legal regimes that otherwise might receive little consideration. Margaret Young provides an
excellent annotated bibliography sketching the contours of scholarly debate in Fragmentation, in Oxford
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which rule takes precedence in the event of a conflict is very much
central to the practice of law. As Martti Koskenniemi highlights, “[l]egal
reason is a hierarchical form of reason, establishing relationships of
inferiority and superiority” between rules and between sources of law or
157
levels of authority. Of course, there is disagreement about whether this
characterization is appropriate at the international level, and certainly
about what a hierarchy of legal sources or principles might actually look
158
like. While many scholars and some international bodies have embraced
the idea of superior or peremptory norms (jus cogens), particularly in regard
to human rights obligations, neither state actions nor the decisions of
159
adjudicative bodies have offered an especially strong endorsement. But, as
Dinah Shelton points out in her centennial essay on norm hierarchy for the
American Journal of International Law, “[p]erhaps the most significant
positive aspect of this trend toward normative hierarchy is its reaffirmation
of the link between law and ethics, in which law is one means to achieve the
160
fundamental values of an international society.” It is certainly the case
that this analytical framework, and in particular the attempt to
conceptually organize various autonomous international legal regimes into
possible norm hierarchies, has significantly impacted what legal scholars
161
study and how practicing lawyers make normative claims.
If we conceive of market principles as a type of global law requiring
analysis by lawyers, how might this conception fit into the norm
hierarchy analytical framework? Such an approach would likely ask
whether the rules embedded in market principles cohere or conflict with
other standards in the global legal system. For example, if the rule
embedded in a particular market principlefor example, the rule of
sovereign debt continuityconflicts with emerging international rules,
such as peremptory norms of human rights, is this a problem? In regard
to the sovereign debt continuity situation, we have reached a point where
we can now imagine prosecuting, or at least condemning, the leaders of a
fallen regime for crimes against a state’s population while simultaneously
expecting that same population to acknowledge and repay the fallen

Bibliographies in International Law (Anthony Carty ed., last modified July 30, 2014), http://
www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-97801997969530113.xml?rskey=cd45Qi&result=2&q=fragmentation#firstMatch .
157. Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8 Eur. J. Int’l L. 566, 566 (1997);
see Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 291, 291 (2006).
158. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public 14–16 (6th ed. 2008).
159. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 157, at 292, 294, 297–317.
160. Id. at 323. Dupuy notes, of course, the continuing difficulty with how to actually identify
fundamental values. Id.
161. For example, a recent volume considers the hierarchy question in the context of human rights
obligations across a range of legal regimes. Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights
(Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012).
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regime’s debts. The basis for condemning the fallen leader might be a
peremptory norm grounded in respect for human rights. But this respect
for human rights does not currently translate into the assessment of
sovereign debt contracts, even if those obligations were entered into in
order to purchase the military hardware used in the oppression or to
163
sustain the regime engaged in the crimes.
This is of course an extreme hypothetical, and there would remain
the technical difficulty of actually pinpointing such funds and also
identifying the breadth of any potentially relevant jus cogens norm. But
currently this incongruence tends not to come up at all, despite the
existence of general calls to attend to human rights as a fundamental
164
legal principle in all areas, including the international economic arena.
Still, this inattention is entirely reasonable so long as we conceive of debt
continuity as simply an objective economic constraint. With the
assumption of an objective constraint, the problematic outcome may be
unfortunate and even immoral, but is largely inevitable due to “market
reality”and thus less likely to be part of core debates in international
law. But if debt continuity is a contingent legal rule and understood to be
part of global law, then this disconnect with a potential jus cogens norm
is a problem of inconsistency that deserves the attention of practicing
lawyers and legal scholars.
D. Fracturing Reputational Consensus
This is not at all to say that increased scrutiny and questions about
lawmaking, accountability, or normative congruence will immediately
change market principles that might be considered problematic. Nor is it
to suggest that active supporters or beneficiaries of a market principle in
a particular situation will have a change of heart and adopt alternative
viewpoints on this basis. Furthermore, there is not likely to be any
adjudication in which market principles clearly win out over (or lose to)
other rules. However, as detailed in the capital controls and debt
continuity examples previously discussed, market principles are
effectively enforced or lose power through the mechanism of reputation
and the subsequent narrowing or opening of policy space for state actors.
And if market principles work through reputation rather than through
traditional sanctions, this provides an opportunity for scrutiny and
discussion to have some impact.

162. See Lienau, supra note 35, at 227.
163. Of course the debt may nonetheless be cancelled under the circumstances, at least if it is held by
public creditors. But any such cancellation would be characterized as charity on the part of creditors, and not
as an act necessitated or mandated by overarching human rights norms and by a related understanding of
inherent limits on state borrowing.
164. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 157, at 294 (noting relevant quotations and citing relevant sources).
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A useful illustration can be provided by returning to the example of
capital mobility. The imposition of controls in one period (t1perhaps
1945 through the mid-1980s) may have been considered unfortunate
from the perspective of some international investors but would still have
been accepted as a generally prudent and careful economic policy,
resulting in only a relatively mild reputational sanction, if any. But not
long after (in t2perhaps late 1980s through the early 2000s), the
imposition of capital controls was read as a heterodox challenge to
market norms due to a different belief about how markets work, and
thus interpreted as an act deserving of greater reputational censure. In
short, it seems that the specific action of imposing controlswhich
remained identicaldid not really trigger the sanction. Nor was there a
change in the official hard law, which remained the same, as discussed in
Part I.B. Rather, the sanction was triggered by the fact that, by the t2 time
period, the meaning various actors ascribed to a state’s decision to
impose controls had changed. At this later moment, such behavior was
read as a rule violation rather than a mere policy preference, due to the
shifted market principle.
So how does this relate to the possible impact of greater attention
from international law? The power of a given market principle rests in
part on the expectation that a particular act will be interpreted as
inappropriate and that the subsequent reputational response will be
largely inevitable. This bolsters its rule-like character and covers over the
fact that the ostensibly inevitable market rule may have been starkly
different not so long ago. But bringing market principles within the
conceptual ambit of legal rules and then treating them as
suchhighlighting how these market principles shift and are likely to have
been politically constructed, asking about the appropriateness of
lawmakers, identifying and problematizing inconsistencies with other
international normscan weaken the mystique of these market givens and
can also undermine any sense that a “violation” will uniformly be
considered inappropriate. In addition, to the extent that a state action can
be framed as reasonablenot a violation of unambiguous rules but
perhaps a balancing of multiple potential rulesthe likelihood of a strong
165
and broad reputational response to any violation should be lower. The

165. This is particularly true given that any reputational response is likely to be mediated through
perceptions of a state’s negotiations with or statements to international actors, including international
financial institutions or investors, in conjunction with any policy action. As is well-studied in international
relations, negotiations by sovereign states can be understood as a two-level game. See generally Robert D.
Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427 (1988)
(providing a classic version of this discussion). The state makes representations to international partners
about what will be domestically acceptable, just as it makes representations to domestic constituents and
interest groups about what is achievable on the international level. Any background discussion that
impacts the perception of how the other party’s audience is likely to react may impact the strategic
thinking around these negotiations.
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capital controls example suggests that, holding the actual state behavior
constant, a reading of the state as a recalcitrant violator of clear rules will
result in a higher sanction. Similarly, if the demands made by international
actors negotiating with a state seem unreasonable in light of questions
about market principle objectivity and normative appropriateness, they
may feel pressure to modify their position.
This multifaceted presentation hardly provides a clear theory of how
attention by international law could have an immediate impact. However,
it arguably maps more accurately onto the ways in which market principles
worknot through win/lose adjudications, but rather in negotiations,
broader audience perceptions, and subsequent reputational effects. In the
sovereign debt continuity case, the example of the Iraqi debt negotiations
after the fall of Saddam Hussein may be relevant. On the one hand, there
were reasonable arguments to be made that some of the debt incurred by
the fallen regime was problematic and should be cancelled. On the other, a
unilateral debt cancellation by the Iraqi government would have been
viewed as unacceptable and would likely have resulted in reputational
consequences. Lee Buchheit, the lead negotiator for the new Iraqi regime,
had the following to say on the background popular discussions of
illegitimate or odious debt, even though the argument was never raised in
the negotiating room itself:
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[The issue] was definitely presentthe atmospherics are unavoidable. The
creditors all dealt with Saddam, and now half castigated him as Beelzebub.
But repudiation or full payment was not a binary choice in the negotiating
context. . . . If we have reached a point where we could legitimately make a
166
claim on odious debt, then they’re already softened up.

Determining when one can “legitimately make a claim,” and arguing
that such a claim is reasonable and supported by at least some swathe of
the global audience, is precisely the bailiwick of the international legal
community. All this is to say that greater international legal scrutiny of
market principles may have an impact in several related ways: by
questioning the seeming clarity or objectivity of those principles and
emphasizing that they are manmade; by asking about the normative
appropriateness of the concomitant rules; and by altering or softening the
interpretations (and reputational consequences) of a state actor as a
recalcitrant violator. Thus, the reputational mechanism itselfthe
intrinsically interactive way that market principles are enforcedprovides
an avenue by which conceiving of these market principles as law and
bringing them into the ambit of international legal work may have an
impact.
E. The Risk of Inadvertent Legitimation
Even if there are significant potential benefits to incorporating
market principles into our understanding of the global legal order, are
there also risks involved? In particular, actors and scholars sometimes
seek to label a body of rules as “law” in an effort to cloak it with a type
of legal legitimacy, and perhaps even to have that legitimacy secured or
confirmed by courts or other decisionmakers. This may be the case for
civil society activists or norm entrepreneurs seeking to deepen or
enshrine a particular moral or political idea through a legal form. It can
also be the case for business entities, which might want to see
controversies settled according to their own business customs, tagged an
emergent lex mercatoria and freed from national regulations that they
would rather disregard. Indeed, the potential distributional ramifications
of such efforts at legitimation through legal labeling are hardly lost on
critics. For example, Stephen Toope has argued that “the so-called lex
mercatoria is largely an effort to legitimise as ‘law’ the economic interests
167
of Western corporations.”
Although this type of legitimation is certainly part of the impetus for
some projects of law-expansion, that is far from the goal of this Article. I
166. Lienau, supra note 35, at 214 (quoting Author’s Interview with Lee C. Buchheit, Partner, Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, in New York City, New York (Sept. 23, 2008)).
167. Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration Between States
and Private Persons 96 (1990).
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do not at all suggest that courts or other decisionmaking actors should
grant these market givens even more legal power than they already have.
Despite their law-like character, it would be hard to characterize them as
broadly legitimate, worthy of further respect and elevation; indeed, these
market principles have not been vetted according to any standard of
168
legitimate lawmaking. While there is no need to engage in the thorny
debates of whether any inherent link exists between law and morality or
law and legitimacyespecially in light of the broad “family resemblance”
169
understanding of law adopted in this Article it seems clear that we
characterize and study a range of rules and directives as law even though
they are morally or politically problematic. As such, understanding the
rules embedded in market principles as part of the global legal world
does not automatically render them worthy of approbation or court
application. However, as detailed more fully in the previous Subparts, it
can help direct toward these market givens the scholarly attention,
critical questioning, and heightened scrutiny generally accorded to law.
Still, to what degree can we really draw such lines or barriers
between the different possible ramifications of labeling? Is it possible to
identify a class of rules as a type of “law” while denying it the legitimacy
frequently (though not uniformly) accorded to the category? There may
be hazards involved in any project of categorization, and reasonable
concerns exist about giving up on more traditionalist state-based
understandings of law. But market principles seem less prone to the risk
of inadvertent legitimation or approbation, in particular because they are
not positioned as normative or legal claims in the first place. Indeed, they
are promoted (if promotion is the right word) by a very different kind of
entrepreneurship than one usually imagines when thinking of norm
advocacy. The more common or cognizable type of legal-normative
entrepreneurship might involve a re-characterization of already present
normative ideas into more comprehensibly legal language. As Bianchi
points out in the case of transparency, “[n]ormative concepts and
prescriptions of a varied nature may exercise significant influence on
international legal processes regardless of their formal status. Such
concepts are often translated into law by means of ‘principles’ . . . in the
170
sense of normative prescriptions of a general character.” Norm
entrepreneurship may also involve claims about law as part of a very

168. This sets aside for now the fact that conceptions of legitimacy are hard to pin down, particularly in
the international arena. See generally Odette Lienau, The Challenge of Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 57 Harv. Int’l L.J. 151 (2016) (providing further discussion on the difficulty of conceptualizing
legitimacy in the sovereign debt context).
169. See discussion of “family resemblance” concept of law supra Part II, text associated with notes
128–130.
170. Bianchi, supra note 145, at 6.
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171

explicit legal policy project, as in the case of the landmine ban. Here,
the proffered norm is presented as morally or politically superior to the
status quo, and as better according with the underlying identities or
values of the actors in questionincluding values enshrined in law, such
as the value of protecting innocent life or respecting human rights.
Although the broad adoption of market principles may well take
significant entrepreneurship, it is of a very different sort than that relevant
for an issue like the landmine ban. In particular, those in favor of a given
market principlefor example, debt continuity or free capital
mobilitywould likely not consider themselves to be advocates for a
particular, changeable law. Indeed, there may be very good reasons for
market principles to remain, so to speak, in hiding from law. This is
because, to anthropomorphize somewhat, perhaps the ultimate goal for all
laws, norms, or collective beliefs (and their respective entrepreneurs) is to
achieve a kind of taken-for-granted status, with the air of unchangeability
it confers. For an openly principled rule such as a prohibition against
slavery or against using a technology such as landmines or chemical
weapons, an explicit legal obligation can formalize and enshrine a
collective belief as being in line with core values of the relevant
community. Such formalization also serves as a clear and deliberate
decision to reject previous (and presumably less enlightened) rules of
international engagement, at least in theory, and can even act as a
172
marker in historical narratives of legal progress. Compliance with the
rule ideally becomes the appropriate and assumed choice in any given
circumstance, even if material consequences or instrumental thinking
173
might recommend in favor of violating the rule.
But for a collective belief such as a market principle, which purports
to narrate how markets function as an objective matter, the relationship
with a legal or political institution can be more problematic. To achieve
ultimate taken-for-grantedness, the consequences of violating this kind of
rule should, perhaps, not be seen to emanate from something so banal and
mortal as an identifiable political institution or legal body promulgating or
enforcing chosen (and therefore challengeable) policies. Rather, the
consequences of violating the expectations implicated by a market
principle should ideally be seen to result from unchanging and objective
economic constraints. To the extent that a market principle can be

171. This example is mentioned briefly in the discussion of constructivism infra Part IV.B.
172. Such narratives have, of course, come under considerable scholarly pressure. See, e.g., Antony
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2007).
173. Constructivists might also focus on the possibility that such rules, collective beliefs, and values
can impact actors’ interests by shaping their identities, such that these actors would consider a violation of
that rule to be contrary to not just their interest but also their identity (be it personal or collective). For an
overview of key themes in constructivism, see infra text associated with notes 188–189 (offering key
examples of constructivist scholarship).
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maintained without any explicit legal groundwork, it may ultimately and
counterintuitively command greater adherence and be viewed as more
legitimate than other deliberately legalized norms. Again, this dynamic
of escaping (or failing to seek) legal characterization does not at all
diminish the fact that these market principles may perform legal work, in
terms of generating implicit but well-understood rules or by pre-selecting
focal points for other legalized forms and undergirding reputational
enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, remaining in the shadows of law may
even allow this legal work to be more effective. This is precisely why
legal scrutiny is important for those market principles considered
normatively problematic.
Thus, even if market principles were conceived of as part of lawand
therefore ultimately as a politically constructed and changeable set of
rulesthe risk of inadvertent legitimation seems minimal given that
advocates of a particular market principle would be unlikely to endorse
this conception. The publicity necessary for any effort to promote external
recognition as law would not only give lie to the idea of these market
principles as objective, but also raise questions about their provenance and
legal legitimacy. This is not to say that advocates of a market idea will not
sometimes make the effort to move toward formalization as hard or soft
law. It is possible that certain groups may consider formal legalization to
offer a valuable additional layer of obligation and controlfor example,
if they believe that the reputational enforcement of a market principle is
insufficient incentive to ensure compliance. One instance of this might be
the effort within the IMF to amend the Articles of Agreement to
enshrine the principle of capital mobility, as previously discussed in Part
II.B. But such efforts are no longer law in hiding and, indeed, they can
expose these market principles to the type of scrutiny and challenge
appropriately accorded to lawmaking and law-reforming activities. This
is precisely the type of scrutiny and challenge that should be directed to
market principles themselves as a more general matter, even if they
174
never emerge as deliberately chosen hard or soft law.
F.

Interacting Rule Forms in the Legal Order

Despite its focus on market principles, this Article does not intend to
take away from any general attentiveness to “law on the books,” whether
those books are formulated by state or non-state actors, and whether the
laws take the form of binding rules or “soft” principles. Indeed, the
interaction between market principles and other rule forms will be fairly
complex for any given issue area, and the analysis in this Article invites

174. Indeed, this is especially important given that this formalization effort does not always happen.
Furthermore, these market principles can act in a powerful legal way even in the absence of formalization
(or as a counter to formalized law).
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further research into these interactions. For example, under what
conditions might a market principle actually obviate formal law, as with
the capital controls example? When might a change in the formal law act
as a focal point for a change in the rule of the market principle itself?
And when does the successful enshrinement of a market principle in
hard law make it stickieras is frequently intended to be the caseand
therefore more likely to exert influence even after the underlying market
principle itself has weakened or disappeared? Does the legal design of the
formal law have an impact on this processfor example, the specificity
and strength of contractual obligations or the degree of delegation to other
decision-making bodies? In short, in addition to the empirical study of
market principles themselves, to which I have already suggested lawyers
can make a distinct contribution, studies could be done on how those
principles interact with other rule forms in the legal order.
The interaction of market principles with other rule forms also
invites deeper thinking on the policy front. For example, it may be the
case that market principles can quietly reshape or effectively block and
render ineffective principles enshrined in other rule forms. In this case,
actors may exclusively direct (or perhaps misdirect) their efforts and
scarce resources to these other rule categoriesthrough treaty writing,
guideline formulation, or doctrinal developmentwhen in fact market
principles themselves are doing the real work. This leads to the
questions: When does this dynamic emerge, and what is the best use of
resources as a result? Given the particular constellation of actors and
institutions that generate and support a given market principle, what
should be the target of greater attention? Leaving market principles
outside our understanding of the global legal order means that these and
many other questions fail to garner the attention they deserve.
IV. The Underinclusiveness of International Legal Theory
If market principles do indeed play an important role in the global
legal ordereither directly or through other legal formswhy has
international law tended to overlook their impact and their potential place
in our legal-analytical and normative frameworks? Especially given the
recently expanded understandings of “international law,” it is perhaps
surprising that international legal scholarship has not given market
principles more focused attention. The absence of such inquiry is even
more puzzling since disciplines cognate to the fieldfor example, certain
variants of political science and economic sociologyreadily embrace the
socially and politically constructed nature of market ideas and market
175
functioning. Indeed, the instability of ostensible market givens, and even

175. For examples of scholarship in cognate disciplines that embrace the constructed nature of markets,
see, among others, Constructing the International Economy (Rawi Abdelal et al. eds., 2010); On
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some of the mechanisms by which they vary, should not sound especially
new to anyone familiar with this literature. And much of the international
legal scholarship over the last several decades that sought to expand the
boundaries of traditional law has very explicitly embraced interdisciplinarity.
One reason for the relative absence of market principles in our
understanding of the global legal order may lie in their epistemological
facadethey are frequently framed and received as descriptive, factual
observations that lead to accepted best practices. As such, their ultimately
manmade and rule-like character can be difficult to identify. But the
omission might also result from tendencies within international legal
scholarship itselfin particular, the tendency of much international legal
scholarship to focus on rule forms that are deliberately chosen by state,
sub-state, or non-state actors. These rules may be more or less formal and
more or less strongly enforced, but legal scholars have tended to define
“law”even in the expanded version discussed in Part II.Aas
including only those directives that actors knowingly select as rules or
guidelines. Thus, international lawyers can accept without difficulty a key
insight from cognate disciplinesnamely, that market ideas are
politically and socially constructed. But because these market ideas are
not presented as rules or laws, their constructedness does not necessarily
challenge how lawyers understand their functioning in the legal world.
And scholars from cognate disciplines may be very interested in the
construction of market givens themselves, but miss their translation into
legal activity and legal modes of analysisor perhaps, as with Michel
176
Callon, tend to use “law” largely as a metaphor.
As such, this Part looks more closely at international legal theory
itself, and considers some of the reasons why market givens have failed
to enter our understanding of global law thus far. The assumed centrality
of deliberate choice in law is true of theoretical approaches that posit
states as rational actors working to secure their own interests, but it is also
true to an important degree even for frameworks drawn from
constructivist theory, which explicitly seeks to demonstrate how broader
normative principles and beliefs may shape actor interests and identities.
Some variants of these approaches even assume a hierarchy in the strength
of legal formsthe idea that there is a legal continuum involving
beliefs/norms, custom, soft law, and then hard lawand may also assume
that rule advocates will want to move up this hierarchy to render their
preferred standard more powerful, with the caveat that occasionally a
“lesser” form of law can better represent underlying goals. Critical
international law scholars perhaps come closest, emphasizing the
Capitalism (Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg eds., 2007); Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics,
Ubiquitous Politics, supra note 17; Laws of the Market, supra note 143; Abdelal, supra note 55;
Chwieroth, supra note 55.
176. Laws of the Market, supra note 143.
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important role of knowledge practices in constituting the content,
boundaries, and distributional ramifications of law. But they have
neglected to focus directly on the shared attributes of market principles
as a class, and their framing of such beliefs and knowledge frameworks as
impacting law (rather than as a type of law itself) paradoxically presses
these insights to the margins of international legal studies.
Given this range of orientations, it seems natural that international
legal theory would tend to overlook the real impact that market
principles can have, and also to miss the way in which they may actually
benefit from escaping the label “law.” In other words, the assumption
that beliefs such as market principles work largely outside the global
legal system can counterintuitively render them even more powerful
within the law, allowing them to act while avoiding the questions about
coherence and accountability that we associate with the legal system.
A. Rational Choice and Options in Law
International legal theory has moved through several waves
following World War II, after which lawyers worked to construct new
global rules and institutions that might prevent future chaos. These
international lawyers tended toward a positivism that promoted formally
binding legal obligations for states, hoping that such rigidity would
provide the best chance of stability going forward. Dominant thinkers in
the field of international relations, however, discounted the importance
of such legal mechanisms, considering them an outgrowth ofand
epiphenomenal tothe fundamentally unchanging state goals of
177
preserving security and maximizing power. These scholars working in
the post-war realist tradition contended that the idealist vision of a lawbased world order would fail to deliver the desired peace, and might
even destabilize global relations, due to its naive assumptions about the
possible depth of interstate cooperation.
Central to the reconciliation of these views has been the rise of
rational choice approaches focused on the ways in which international
institutions may serve state ends. This rationalist institutionalist
framework, at least in its earlier forms, tended to accept the realist
assumptions of a unitary state acting in its own predetermined interests.
But it contended that such interests might nonetheless coincide with

177. The classic post-World War II text on political realism is Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among
Nations (1948). Drawing from this tradition, George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom
cast doubt on the real meaning of compliance in Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation? 50 Int’l Org. 379, 406 (1996). Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner offer an update on certain
elements of this realist take, suggesting that customary international law is simply a series of behavioral
regularities accompanied by “law-talk” to signal future intentions to continue the behavior. For a recent
iteration, see generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005).
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those of other states and thus pave the way for cooperation. Interstate
interaction in this model is not necessarily zero-sum, with a clear winner
and loser, but rather can enhance the welfare of all actors if coordination
and defection problems are overcome. Once states select and establish
an institution or set of rules, it shapes state behavior and further
incentivizes cooperation by altering the costs and rewards of given
choices. However, the institutions and rules themselves are established to
serve states’ long-run interests, and they are adhered to so long as those
interests appear to be promoted.
International law scholars working within this broad rationalist
approach have expanded both the range of institutional choice and the
actors under study, all while remaining within a paradigm that
understands law as a deliberately chosen endeavor. To begin with, they
have expanded the legal forms under consideration, moving away from
any assumption that stringent obligations are necessarily optimal and
highlighting how states can select among a number of institutional forms
179
in response to different foreign policy goals. For example, Kenneth
Abbott and Duncan Snidal noted that, while states may opt into hard law
legalization, they might also “choose softer forms of legalized
180
governance when those forms offer superior institutional solutions.”
Pursuing this theme of a continuum in legal form and commitment
capacity from which actors may select, Andrew Guzman suggests that the
difference between formal treaties, soft law, customary international law,
and international norms “is a matter of degree rather than kind. Formal
treaties lie at one end of a spectrum of commitment, with mere norms at
the other end and customary international law and soft law in
181
between.” He argues that this categorization corresponds to the likely
effect that these forms will have on behavior, asserting that it is “possible
to identify a hierarchy of international law rules, with treaties the most
likely to affect behavior, norms the least, and soft law and customary
182
international law in between[.]” Speaking specifically of norms, which
are at the bottom of this hierarchy, Guzman describes them as “very
much like [customary international law]they lack explicit consent, are
unwritten, and are often vague. In addition, they lack the ‘bindingness’ of

178. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (1984) (providing a classic illustration).
179. Early on in this scholarly development, the editors of a special issue of the flagship international
relations journal International Organization posited that “legalization” might vary according to rule
precision, obligation, and delegation to a third-party decisionmaker. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The
Concept of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 401, 401 (2000).
180. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 26, at 421.
181. Guzman, supra note 4, at 9.
182. Id. at 214; see id. at 214 fig.6.1.
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custom. As such, the consequences of failing to honor them, while often
183
real, are less than is the case for custom.”
While these rational choice scholars do seem to have assumptions
about legal strength and weakness, this does not lead them to say that the
strongest legal forms will necessarily be preferable. Early on, Abbot and
Snidal argued that soft law, while sometimes a step along the route to full
legalization, can also be “preferable on its own terms. . . . [and] provides
184
certain benefits not available under hard legalization.” Guzman also
emphasizes the significant choice available in the range of agreement
types, including “the decision to adopt a treaty rather than soft law, the
provision or omission of dispute resolution and monitoring, and the
185
inclusion or omission of reservations, escape clauses, and exit clauses.”
Further highlighting the deliberately strategic dimension of selecting
across legal forms, Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack note that hard and
soft law are not necessarily complements but may also act as
antagoniststhat is, actors can use these forms to obfuscate and to
186
undermine arrangements with which they disagree. Edward Swaine and
others have taken rational choice beyond formalized agreements, arguing
that even customary international law may serve an instrumental purpose
187
for states.
Although rational choice understandings of international law
originally tended to posit the state as the main actor, the expansions of
international law discussed in Part II.A have encompassed an even
broader range of lawmaking entitiesfrom transgovernmental networks
to corporations and other non-state entities. But these endeavors still
183. Id. at 214. As the examples in Part I make clear, this Article suggests that the relationship
between official “bindingness” and legal effectiveness is more complicated.
184. Abbott and Snidal identify the benefits of soft law to include that it is easier to achieve, more
effective in dealing with uncertainty, and more likely to effectuate compromise. Abbott & Snidal, supra
note 26, at 423.
185. Guzman, supra note 4, at 131. For more on the reasons that states might select soft law, see
Guzman & Meyer, supra note 26, at 171. For an early cautionary note against oversimplifying the category of
“soft law,” see C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law,
38 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 850 (1989).
186. For Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, the key question on the interaction of hard and soft law is
“one of specifying the conditions under which actors are likely to employ hard and soft law as alternatives,
complements, or antagonists.” Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 706, 709 (2010). Kal Raustiala
criticizes the hard versus soft law terminology but emphasizes the tradeoffs states must choose between in
making decisions about legality (that is, binding versus nonbinding agreements), substantive deviation from
the status quo, and structures for monitoring and punishing. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in
International Agreements, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 581, 582 (2005); see Raustiala, supra note 26, at 3 (noting that
international lawmakers may have a choice of whether to regulate through formal mechanisms or through
more informal, network based approaches). All of this resonates with the international rational design
literature more generally. See, e.g., Koremenos et al., supra note 27.
187. Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 Duke L.J. 559, 565 (2002) (emphasizing that custom fits
into rational choice perspectives once we recognize both the broad range and the interdependence of
strategic games implied by this approach).
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share in common an idea that some range of rational actors are choosing
and designing a legal form to best serve their collective interests. This
literature has thus undermined the strict positivist assumption that only
binding “real law” agreements do meaningful work while remaining
within the broader conceptual framework of understanding law as
chosen, albeit as chosen in different forms to serve multiple types of
actors.
B. Aspirational Law in Constructivism
Even international law scholarship influenced by constructivist
theory in international relationswhich is very carefully attuned to the
centrality of collective beliefs and shared understandingshas, perhaps
surprisingly, often overlooked or under-characterized the multiple ways
in which market principles can play a part in the global legal order. In
particular, much of this work, even while rejecting key premises of a
rationalist framework, has similarly emphasized the deliberate or chosen
element of norm propagation in international law. It has also sometimes
accepted the assumptions of a progression or hierarchy from mere shared
understandings to more concrete forms of lawtending to assume that
beliefs (to anthropomorphize for a moment) aspire to higher levels of
formality and publicity. But in fact, as was previously suggested in Part
III.E, there is reason to think that the legal work done by market
principles, in terms of pre-selecting plausible policies and encouraging
compliance through reputational mechanisms, may be more successful if
the norm or standard itself never becomes interpreted as “legal.”
In the last twenty years, thinking and writing in international relations
and international law has been affected significantly by theoretical
approaches that explicitly emphasize the importance of shared beliefs.
Speaking very generally, this constructivist turn in international relations
theory highlights the importance of collective ideas and social norms in
shaping outcomes in global affairs. It asserts that state and actor interests
and preferences cannot simply be assumed, and underscores the centrality
of knowledge and of norms, including those developed through
international organizations and legal institutions, in constructing state
188
interests and even constituting state identities. States and other actors in
this view are motivated not only by an instrumental logic of consequences,
as in the rationalist approach, but also by a “logic of appropriateness,”
which considers what would be appropriate or legitimate behavior for an

188. Several key texts on this approach include: Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International
Politics (1999); Kratochwil, supra note 141; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International
Society (1996); The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (Peter J.
Katzenstein ed., 1996). This list is hardly exhaustive, of course.
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actor of a given position or identity in a given social context. As such,
law and legal rules are not merely an outcome or dependent
variablean end product chosen by parties to facilitate coordination or
cooperation in service of their predetermined goalsbut rather can be
understood as part of a dynamic in which states, other actors, and the
larger institutional and social structures in which they are embedded are
mutually constituted over time. And part of the distinctive nature of
legalized norms in this view involves the important (if sometimes
amorphous) element of legal legitimacy, supported in part by the
190
interaction between law and collective social practice.
To an important degree, discussions of international law drawing
from constructivist theoretical frameworks reject the instrumentalist
state choice element of rationalist institutionalism. But this hardly
suggests either that purposeful legal action disappears from the account
or that the role of less deliberately chosen principles in legal work is
promoted to the center of attention. In characterizing purposeful action,
constructivist scholars have tended to suggest that states may enter into
international legal instruments of various sorts not to promote
unwavering interests in maximizing security, power, or wealth, but rather
in support of historically contingent political or moral principles (or
historically contingent understandings of security and economic interest)
that they deem to be legitimate and valuable. In surveying the literature
for an edited volume building on the insights of constructivist scholarship,
and quite explicitly designed to be “read as a counterpoint to the ‘rationalist’
approach,” Christian Reus-Smit notes that actors create institutions,
including international legal institutions, “not only as functional solutions to
co-operation problems, but also as expressions of prevailing conceptions of
legitimate agency and action that serve, in turn, as structuring frameworks
191
for the communicative politics of legitimation.”
In characterizing norm-based thinking on treaties, Oona Hathaway
notes that “governments create and comply with treaties not only
because they expect a reward for doing so, but also because of their
commitment (or the commitment of transnational actors that influence
192
them) to the norms or ideas embodied in the treaties.” While the state
remains a key actor in these processes of social construction and identity
formation, non-state actors including international institutions, domestic
189. See, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political
Orders, 52 Int’l Org. 943, 951 (1998).
190. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of
Law and Politics, 55 Int’l Org. 743, 744 (2001); Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and
Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 75 (2010).
191. The Politics of International Law 5 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004). Reus-Smit specifically
identifies the 2000 Legalization and World Politics special issue of International Organization, mentioned
in text above, as paradigmatic of the rationalist approach the volume aims to challenge. Id. at 11.
192. Hathaway, supra note 35, at 47.
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and transnational interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, and
even individuals also play an important role in this element of choice and
agency. Providing one key example, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink have highlighted the role of “norm entrepreneurs,” who very
deliberately promote particular visions of appropriate conduct and who
work to eliminate alternatives in order to further their values and
193
beliefs. Thus, this scholarship on shared beliefs in international legal
processes, while emphasizing the ways in which norms can actively
constitute law and actors, has still paid less attention to the role played
by more quiet assumptions about markets and their causal effect.
Perhaps deepening this tendency to overlook the role of market
principles, constructivist work in international law, like variants of
rationalist institutionalism, has also sometimes assumed a continuum of
effectiveness that corresponds to the “hardness” or at least the
“legalness” of the law in question. Suggesting the greater strength of
more concrete legal forms, Finnemore notes that, “[p]articularly for new
or emergent normative claims where few ‘hard’ law obligations exist,
activists seek to generate this kind of felt obligation as a means of
194
promoting ‘harder’ legal obligations in the future.” Implying an
intermediate or stepping-stone character of soft law, David Trubek notes
that such instruments may help to develop “non-binding standards that
can eventually harden into binding rules once uncertainties are reduced
195
and a higher degree of consensus ensues.” And a consideration of
practice confirms this dynamic across multiple issue areas. For example,
legally binding environmental treaties such as the Montreal Protocol on
Substances Depleting the Ozone Layer, now involving third-party review
of implementation, progressed from more aspirational language
196
developed by key non-state and state supporters. And perhaps the
greatest success understood along these lines is the adoption of the
Landmines Convention in 1997, only five years after the launch of the
197
campaign to ban landmines by six NGOs in 1992.
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, also working from a constructivist
perspective, offer a valuable caveat here, cautioning “against undue faith

193. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,
52 Int’l Org. 887–917 (1998).
194. Martha Finnemore, New Directions, New Collaborations for International Law and International
Relations, in International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice 271
(Thomas J. Biersteker et al. eds., 2007).
195. David M. Trubek et al., ‘Soft Law,’ ‘Hard Law,’ and EU Integration, in Law and New Governance
in the EU and the US 89 (Gráinne De Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
196. See, e.g., Brunnée & Toope, supra note 190, at 126–219 (providing further information on the
development of the climate regime).
197. Richard Price, Emerging Customary Norms and Anti-Personnel Landmines, in The Politics
of International Law, supra note 191.
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in formal law-making.”
They draw from Lon Fuller’s previously
mentioned theory of the rule of law to develop an interactional account of
international legal obligation that emphasizes the centrality of ongoing and
199
shared practices of legality in creating and maintaining law. Brunnée and
Toope thus disrupt the assumption of a clear hierarchy among legal forms,
allowing for the possibility that less formal codes may more effectively
generate a sense of legal obligation, which they consider to be “the value200
added of law.” They note that “it is not enough to cast socially shared
understandings in legal form . . . [W]ithout sufficiently dense interactions
and participation of its members, positive law will remain, or become, dead
201
letter.”
Brunnée and Toope’s project resonates with my own in shifting
attention away from what is called law and instead focusing on the
various criteria of legality and the multiple ways and forms in which such
criteria may be met. But the focus on identifying law for the purpose of
understanding legal obligation differs from my effort to understand how
market principles function as a type of law in global governance. While
legal obligation may indeed be a central value-added of law, it is also the
case that certain rules that we now understand without much controversy
to be worthy of study as part of international law do not in fact provide
this element, at least not in much depthcertain informal rules on
banking, perhaps, or even the “dead letter” hard law we nonetheless
require our students to understand (and maybe criticize, helping to ensure
it remains dead). Indeed, certain types of market beliefs may meet
important criteria of legality and act as law without generating a subjective
sense of legal obligationwithout being recognized or felt as law. Again,
my goal in making this suggestion is not to contend that these market
principles should in fact generate felt legal obligation or that they should
be applied by decisionmaking bodies as if they do generate such
obligation. Rather, the goal is to put them at the core of legal analysis and
criticism.
C. Critical Law and Disciplinary Boundaries
All that said, certain insights drawn from constructivism clearly
resonate with this Article’s understanding of the potential roles of
market principles in international law. In particular, studies of how shared
understandings may shape and predetermine meaning and interest have
informed my thinking. Constructivist and critical work in the political
198. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 190, at 75.
199. Brunnée and Toope list the criteria of legality as: generality, promulgation, nonretroactivity, clarity,
noncontradiction, not asking the impossible, constancy, and congruence between rules and official action. Id.
at 6.
200. Id. at 77.
201. Id. at 69–70.
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science subfield of international political economy, which questions the
possibility of a purely materialist theory of market functioning, emphasizes
that “international norms define the boundaries of choice and thereby
affect how societies, policymakers, and market participants discern the
202
meaning of various policy stances.” These collective ideas become most
powerful when they are taken for grantedwhen actors accept them as
the only realistic response to a given issue rather than one among several
203
plausible policy choices. And research on epistemic communities,
which has looked at knowledge-based networks organized around
technical areas such as science or economics, has demonstrated the
impact of shared understandings that gain authority in part from
204
perceptions of expertise and impartiality.
To an important degree, these insights from related disciplines do
resonate with elements found in international law studies, particularly
with those variants of critical international legal scholarship that attend
to the effect of background narratives and collective beliefs. At a
theoretical level, scholars have highlighted how such background ideas
construct elements of international law, and also how these ideas are
shapedand indeed are shaped as backgroundby the concepts and
practice of international law itself. For example, Martti Koskenniemi has
highlighted that “[t]he law constructs its own field of application as it goes
along, through a normative language that highlights some aspects of the
205
world while leaving other aspects in the dark.” Fleur Johns demonstrates
through a range of close case studies how international lawyers “make nonlaw . . . that is, routinely shape understandings of what stands opposed to or
206
outside the reach of legal norms.” David Kennedy has written of how
knowledge practices and expertise, including legal and institutional
expertise, shape our understanding of the world (and thus shape the world
itself)for example, by marking out certain economic frameworks and
activities as natural or inevitable and insulating them from political
207
contestation. Kennedy argues that participants in global governance
“underestimate the plasticity and policy potential of what they take to be

202. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 9.
203. See, e.g., id. at 10–11. Constructivist theory outside of political economy also emphasizes the power
attaching to a norm when it achieves this “taken for granted” character.
204. See, e.g., Haas, supra note 126, at 1–35 (1992); Adler, supra note 126.
205. Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument 570 (2005).
206. Fleur Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law 1 (2011). Johns further notes
that this constrains what is considered politically possible: “lawyers’ practice of making non-legalities
entails the continual making and remaking of global political possibilities.” Id. at 1.
207. See generally David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape
Global Political Economy (2016). Kennedy developed these arguments through a series of earlier pieces.
See, e.g., David Kennedy, International Legal Theory: Law and the Political Economy of the World,
26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 7, 12–13, 40–41 (2013) [hereinafter Kennedy, International Legal Theory].
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the ‘background’” and also fail to fully recognize “their own complicity in
208
what they see as background.” Focusing on ideas of democracy in
international legal practice, Susan Marks uses the concept of ideology to
emphasize how meaning and ideas (including legal meaning) can sustain
relations of domination, and notes the international legal relevance of the
concept of reification, developed by Georg Lukács, to describe “a process
by which human products come to appear as if they were material things,
209
and then to dominate those who produced them.”
Why, then, are these insights not already closer to the core of
210
mainstream international law scholarship and practice? And, relatedly,
why have market principles not fully entered our conception of global law
through this scholarly pathway? The critical scholars just mentioned are
engaged in an uncovering project of sortsan effort to bring understudied
but significant issues into legal vision, even to make them part of “law,”
broadly understood. Johns notes that part of her aim is “to make politically
navigable and questionable some aspect(s) of international legal work
211
previously, for the most part, un- or under-acknowledged.” Kennedy calls
upon international lawyers to recognize their own disciplinary
assumptionsincluding their narratives and knowledge practicesas part
of policymaking, governance, and rulership, and to embrace the political
212
contestation and choice within these activities.
But, in a way, the language and framing of these arguments may not
always further the goal of encouraging more direct engagement by a
broader swathe of the legal profession. Indeed, they may even work at

208. David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the Politics
of Expertise, 5 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 463, 491 (2001) [hereinafter Kennedy, The Politics of the
Invisible College].
209. Susan Marks uses John Thompson’s formulation of ideology as “ways in which meaning serves
to establish and sustain relations of domination.” Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions:
International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology 10 (2000). For discussion on reification,
see id. at 21. Indeed, we could go even further back to Karl Marx himself, the grandfather of studies of
law, ideology, and political economy.
210. Beyond these theoretical insights, more specific studies by these scholars resonate with the
arguments in this Article about how market principles can work in the global legal order. For example,
Johns’ chapters on “pre-legality” in cross-border investment deals and “supra-legality” in the international
legal treatment of climate science are very relevant. Johns, supra note 206. Also of importance is David
Kennedy’s frequently cited article on the post-Cold War narratives shaping West European engagements
with the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe. David Kennedy, Turning to Market Democracy: A
Tale of Two Architectures, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 373 (1991).
211. Johns, supra note 206, at 9. Echoing Kennedy’s suggestion:
[That] [i]f international law and lawyers are shown to be complicit in constituting and/or
entrenching that which they purport to stand against . . . then attributions of responsibility and
questions of reform might emerge that are different to those currently circulating in much
contemporary international legal literature.
Id.
212. See, e.g., Kennedy, International Legal Theory, supra note 207, at 37, 40; Kennedy, The Politics of
the Invisible College, supra note 208, at 495–96.
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cross-purposes. In particular, lawyers and legal scholars ultimately (and
understandably) are most comfortable working with and within “law.”
Even those attorneys who do not conceive of themselves as mere
functionaries will probably prefer to engage in their practice and
professional projects in a recognizably legal manner. Requesting that
they also expressly adopt political struggle, non-law, ideology, or the
dark spaces left by law’s “going along” (in Koskenniemi’s words) is,
potentially, a significant pivot away from their disciplinary comfort zone.
Kennedy seems to understand this difficulty, and quite explicitly aims to
inspire or exhort attorneys to political consciousness. But asking them to
cast off their disciplinary selves to emerge (like superman, perhaps) as
Weberian politicians might be too muchmany lawyers, perhaps
unfortunately, have not entered the profession to confront politics and
be faced with the burden of political choice at every turn.
Similarly, Johns acknowledges that she adopts a vocabulary of “non213
legalities” that lawyers tend not to use. Indeed, the harried law firm
associate featured in Johns’ study of the micro-foundations and prelegalities of a cross-border investment deal is no doubt only too grateful
to rely on those pre-legalities, and to avoid further expanding her
analytical duties to include recognition of the non-legality shaped
through her own legal work. Even as many lawyers and legal scholars are
enriched by these important reframings, others will resist (and even
resent) the conceptual moves. These critical analyses represent a real
paradigm shifta simultaneous elevation and diminution of legal
activityfor a professional group historically committed to the uniqueness
of its disciplinary practice, identity, and distinctive forms of reasoning.
Furthermore, this paradigm shift is not entirely necessary. The
concept of law itselfparticularly in its current expansive manifestation
in the international arenais already sufficiently broad and flexible to
include market principles. The point is not only to make the functioning
of these market givens visible, which they are to some degree in other
fields, but to make them visible as law and as engaging in cognizably
legal functionality. Lawyers have a range of analytical methods and
questions for dealing with lawlex in Latinthat are entirely
appropriate for approaching a kind of lex clandestinus or lex furtivus, but
translate somewhat more awkwardly to the framework of ideology, nonlaw, or knowledge practices. In some ways, critical international legal
scholars have shared with rational choice and constructivist scholars a
willingness to accept the conventional conceptual boundaries of law, in
that they seem to implicitly concur that the components of law and of a

213. Johns, supra note 206, at 1.
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legal order itself must be deliberately chosen. Despite the embrace of
immanent critique, there has been insufficient recognition of the critical
potential immanent within the category of law itself.
In sum, multiple variants of international legal scholarshipby
implicitly or explicitly assuming that international rules must result from
deliberate choicehave tended to ignore the possibility that certain
collective understandings may act as law without aspiring to be
recognized as such. This disregard pushes the legal functioning of these
market principles further from critical scrutiny, especially when
compared to the substantial scholarly activity directed at other areas now
included within (but traditionally excluded from) international law,
including informal soft law guidelineslex mercatoriaand normative
concepts and principles. And to the extent that scholarship helps to
shape the broader understanding and treatment of rules that we live
under, the insufficient (or insufficiently direct) treatment of market
principles in legal scholarship may help to entrench their quiet and
under-examined power globally. This means that market principles have
many of the benefits of lawas being politically constructed directives
that command a significant degree of power and adherencewithout the
attendant scrutiny usually accorded to law. By contrast, I hope that
identifying how market givens act as a type of law, albeit a hidden and
sometimes problematic law, can help to put them squarely at the center
of such examination.
Conclusion: The Sailing Ship of International Legal Expansion
It may come as a surprise that, although I nest these arguments about
market principles within expanded understandings of international law, I
actually wish to remain agnostic on whether this conceptual expansion of
law has been an entirely good thing. Almost three decades ago, Sally Engle
Merry expressed concern that “calling all forms of ordering that are not state
215
law by the term law confounds the analysis.” And scholars such as Jean
d’Aspremont note that lawyerly scrutiny can be employed without
expanding the idea of international law itself. Indeed, it might be a problem
that legal analysts seem unwilling or unable to direct their examination
beyond legal boundaries:

214. This may result, in part, from an understanding of international law as grounded in “what
international lawyers say and do.” Id. at 12; see sources and quotations provided id. at 12 n.24. Although I
agree with this flexible practice-based framework to an extent, this provides insufficient conceptual space
for thinking through the ways in which market givens function in (and as) international law as well.
215. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 869, 878 (1988).
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[I]nternational legal scholars are uneasy when grappling with a given
question without including it in the realm of international law. It is as if
international legal scholars cannot zero-in on non-legal phenomena
without feeling a need to label them as law. . . . One continues to wonder,
however, why international legal scholars cannot study the phenomenon
216
without portraying it as a legal phenomenon.

In some ways, this concern resonates with the encouragement from
critical scholars and also law and society scholars to look beyond the
traditional boundaries of law itself, though d’Aspremont has a different
theoretical perspective. While this is certainly fair, and indeed I do not
disagree that lawyers should feel free to look beyond the boundaries of
law, I also worry about the degree to which these exhortations are likely
to be successful. Certainly international legal scholars can study
phenomena without portraying them as legal. But will they to the same
extent? And will they study and criticize them in similar types of ways?
Part of my goal here is to lower the conceptual and analytical threshold
for engagement, and to encourage the more widespread application of a
lawyerly analytical toolkit to market principles.
Furthermore, I wonder if this concern tends to over-essentialize the
category or concept of law itself. A narrower understanding of the
concept of international law may be useful for certain political
projectsincluding, perhaps, the important project of protecting state
sovereignty. So I leave others to debate whether it is best, as a normative
matter, to insist that the classic, state consent-based sources of law should
be defended against encroachment, particularly in courts and other
decisionmaking bodies. But this is ultimately an argument about political
and doctrinal strategy, and does not necessarily undermine the idea that
the conceptual family of law itself is broad enough to include market
principles.
Of course, it is possible that by participating in this expansioneven
if only at the level of theorythis Article entrenches it further. While
this is a fair concern, my own perspective is that the ship of expanding
international law has already sailed. If that is the case, the focus should
be on a careful consideration of the distinctions between more or less
acceptable law, and, relatedly, on which law should be challenged and
remade. My suspicion is that many market principles, subjected to this
analysis, will be found lacking not only in inevitability but also in those
factors that might lead actors to consider a legal rule to be legitimate. To
the extent that a normative hierarchy is thought to existat least in the

216. Jean d’Aspremont, Epistemic Forces in International Law: Foundational Doctrines and
Techniques of International Legal Argumentation 57–58 (2015); see also Jean d’Aspremont, From a
Pluralization of International Norm-Making Processes to a Pluralization of the Concept of International Law,
in Informal International Lawmaking, supra note 134, at 199.
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arguments and atmospherics that can impact reputational judgments and
so shape a state’s policy spacemarket principles are unlikely to stand at
the apex. But if they stand outside of these questions altogether, they may
well come out ahead without much thought or scrutiny. Writing in the
context of legal pluralism, and with concern for protecting independent
normative orders, Ralf Michaels has noted that, “[t]he power of nonstate norms may lie in their otherness, in their character as non-law. This
power is easily reduced, these non-state orders are domesticated, once
217
we reconceptualize these norms as law.” While the application and
motivation is different, this basic insight is relevant: Reframing a
phenomenon as “law” can have a domesticating and demystifying effect.
To the extent that international legal scholarship has already accepted
the step of conceptual expansion, we lose considerable powerrelative
to market principles themselvesby not including them within the
conceptual family of global law.

217. Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge
from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1209, 1257 (2005).
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